Joint Pub 3-08

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

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This, the first edition of Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," represents a major milestone in our efforts to improve interagency coordination across the range of military operations.

Joint Pub 3-08 provides the principles and guidance for accomplishing interagency coordination and discusses "real-world" examples of this important process. It outlines responsibilities and tasks for joint force commanders and describes key US Government agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations. The fundamental concepts contained in this publication provide joint doctrine for the creative and visionary use of our Nation's military power, particularly in "military operations other than war."

Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. To that end, commanders must understand the principles of Joint Pub 3-08 and bring them to bear during joint and multinational operations. Accordingly, please ensure the widest distribution of this and other joint publications, and promote their use at every opportunity.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

This volume discusses the interagency environment and describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commands of the Department of Defense and agencies of the US Government, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. It provides potential methodologies to synchronize successful interagency operations. Volume II describes the key US Government departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Outlines the Interagency Process and Participants**
- **Explains the Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process**
- **Describes Interagency Coordination**
- **Explains the Role of the National Security Council System**
- **Discusses Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level**
- **Outlines Joint Task Force Roles and Responsibilities**

The Interagency Process and Participants

Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.

Interagency coordination **forges the vital link** between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The **intrinsic nature of interagency coordination** demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.

Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase in situations — primarily overseas — in which civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. Many organizations are drawn closer to military forces because their missions may fail without military support or protection.

Interagency Coordination

Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation is critical to success.

The **security challenges** facing the nation today are increasingly complex, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. These include USG agencies, partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), regional and international organizations, and the agencies of the host country. **Efforts must be coordinated** despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies.

An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimately contribute to unity of effort.

Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques. To be successful, the interagency process should **bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations**. This is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations viewed in isolation. When the other instruments of national power — economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational — are applied, the dimensions of the effort and the number and types of interactions expand significantly.

BASIC STEPS TO BUILDING AND MAINTAINING COORDINATION

- DEFINE THE PROBLEM IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS AGREED TO BY ALL PARTICIPANTS
- DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE
- ESTABLISH A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
- DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION / OPTIONS
- CAPITALIZE ON EXPERIENCE
- ESTABLISH RESPONSIBILITY
- PLAN FOR THE TRANSITION OF KEY RESPONSIBILITIES, CAPABILITIES, AND FUNCTIONS
- DIRECT ALL MEANS TOWARD UNITY OF EFFORT

Interagency Process at the National Level

Coordinating the activities of the various government agencies is fundamental to the efficient use of national resources.

The **interagency process at the national level** is grounded within the **Constitution** and established by law in the **National Security Act of 1947** (NSA 47). The National Security Council (NSC) is a product of NSA 47.

The National Security Council System is the principal forum for consideration of issues of national security requiring Presidential decisions.

The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic. Together with supporting interagency working groups, high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, **the National Security Council System provides the foundation for interagency coordination** in the development and implementation of

national security policy. The NSC staff is the President's personal and principal staff for national security issues. It tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President.

Interagency Coordination for Domestic Operations

The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense Executive Agent for provision of military support to civil authorities and responds to the National Command Authorities when coordinating with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, **may include** military support to civil authorities, which is Department of Defense (DOD) support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies that result from natural or manmade causes, or military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). MSCLEA also includes, but is not limited to military assistance to civil disturbances; Key Asset Protection Program; and interagency assistance, to include training support to law enforcement agencies, support to counterdrug operations, support for combatting terrorism, and improvised device response.

In all of these efforts, **the military brings unique and very useful capabilities to the interagency forum** that have value in domestic support. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all bear on the employment of the military in domestic operations. Considering the increased emphasis on domestic roles for the Department of Defense, **a balance must be defined during the planning phase** between the military capabilities and resources that can be applied to a situation and the constraints of law.

Interagency Coordination for Foreign Operations

The Department of State advises and assists the President in foreign policy formulation and execution.

Operations in foreign areas arise as a result of the United States' external relationships and how they bear on the national interest. **For the Department of Defense, in the politico-military domain, this involves** bilateral and multilateral military relationships, treaties involving DOD interests, technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, and humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

Within a theater, **the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.** Coordination between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies may occur through a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General may be involved. The US interagency structure within foreign countries involves the

Ambassador, country team system (which includes the Defense Attache Office and the Security Assistance Organization), the American Embassy public affairs officer, United States Information Service, and geographic combatant commands.

Command Relationships

The Armed Forces perform in both supported and supporting roles with other agencies.

The **National Command Authorities establish supported and supporting command relationships** between combatant commanders when deployment and execution orders are issued. The commanders of the geographic combatant commands, supported by the functional combatant commands or other geographic combatant commanders, provide forces and resources to accomplish the mission. This command relationship among the combatant commanders lends itself to the interagency process.

NGOs and PVOs do not operate within either the military or the governmental hierarchy. Therefore, **the relationship between Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs** is neither supported nor supporting, but rather **an associate or partnership relationship**.

Nongovernmental Organizations and Private Voluntary Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) play an important role in providing support to host nations.

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, **NGOs and PVOs are frequently on the scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas.** They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs and PVOs are diverse, flexible, independent, and grassroots-focused and are primary relief providers. NGOs and PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide **enables the NGO and PVO community to wield a great deal of power** within the interagency community.

Mutually beneficial arrangements between the Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crisis, **NGOs and PVOs can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.** In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the

commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action. Their extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations make these organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments as well as civilian attitudes toward the operation.

Regional and International Organizations

Regional and international organizations possess area or global influence.

Regional and international organizations have **well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities** and are usually equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency operations. Regional examples include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Western European Union, and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. International examples include the United Nations and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level

Interagency forums established early at the operational level will enable close and constructive dialogue between the engaged agencies.

Steps for combatant commands that support effective interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives include: (1) identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation; (2) establish an interagency hierarchy and define the objectives of the response effort; (3) define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities; (4) solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays; (5) identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities; (6) identify the resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort; (7) define the desired end state and exit criteria; (8) maximize the mission's assets to support the longer term goals of the enterprise; and (9) establish interagency assessment teams.

For interagency crisis response for operations within the United States and its territories (other than for acts of terrorism), **the Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense Executive Agent for execution and management of military support to civil authorities.** The Secretary of Defense retains the authority to approve the deployment of combatant command resources and to authorize DOD involvement in operations that may include the use of lethal force (e.g., civil disturbances). The Secretary of the Army

executes and manages domestic operations through the Director of Military Support and the supported geographic combatant commander. When the Department of Defense responds to acts of terrorism, the Secretary of Defense personally oversees the operation. Early in crisis action planning for operations outside the continental United States and its territories, **the geographic combatant commander communicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s)** as part of crisis assessment. The Ambassador and country team are often aware of factors and considerations that the geographic combatant commander might apply to develop courses of action, and they are key to bringing together US national resources within the host country.

Joint Task Force Interagency Operations

A combatant commander may designate a joint task force to conduct the military portion of interagency operations.

The unique aspects of the interagency process require the **joint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant** of the capabilities of not only the JTF's components, but other agencies as well. When designating a JTF, the combatant commander will select a commander of the joint task force, assign a joint operations area, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, and either allocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command or request forces from supporting combatant commands. In contrast to the established command structure of a combatant command or joint task force, NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities. Upon identifying organizational or operational mismatches between organizations, the staff of the combatant command or JTF should designate points in the NGO and PVO organizations at which liaison and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate. These may include the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, the Logistics Operations Center, and a liaison section.

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is **the deployment of a JTF assessment team** to the projected joint operations area. The assessment team may help clarify the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of force is required, the proper sequence for deployment of the force, availability of state and local or in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by organizations other than military forces. **The JTF commander should consider the establishment of an executive steering group, civil-military operations center, and liaison teams.** Other JTF interagency considerations

are intelligence support and control, logistic support, legal support, media affairs, and space support.

CONCLUSION

This publication discusses the interagency environment; describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination between the combatant commanders and agencies of the USG, NGOs and PVOs, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations; and provides potential methodologies to conduct successful interagency operations. It also describes the key USG departments and agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship (or potential relationship) with the Armed Forces of the United States.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Unity of Effort Flows From the National Level

"When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety of Federal departments and agencies. The President, assisted by the National Security Council, develops national security strategy, employing all elements of national power to secure national security objectives. In support of this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advises the President and Secretary of Defense (the National Command Authorities, or NCA) concerning the application of military power. Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals for a projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated. The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus is essential. This is the case not only for war involving simultaneous major combat in multiple theaters, but also for the more likely case of regional crises. In such cases, a single combatant command is normally supported, with others providing that support, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA as coordinator of the whole effort. Even here, use of American military power directly or indirectly affects the other combatant commands and Federal agencies. Unity of effort — directed and arranged at the national level — is critical."

Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Understanding Interagency Operations

The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Clausewitz wrote: "The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the growth of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation, with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. **Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the US Government (USG) as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations.** These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood. Whether military forces are involved in the detention of migrants in Guantanamo Bay, countering the flow of drugs from Latin America, stopping a tyrannical invader in the Middle East, providing humanitarian assistance to a storm-ravaged populace, or making peace on the Horn of Africa, success will depend to a large

extent on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power. Interagency coordination[1] forges the vital link between the military instrument of that power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as nongovernmental organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

2. Synchronizing Interagency Operations

The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military operations other than war (MOOTW), **is the broad range of agencies** — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — **that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States**. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines work heroically with various agencies every day. Military forces have long coordinated with the headquarters or operating elements of the Departments of State (DOS) and Transportation (DOT), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the adjutants general of the 50 states and four territories. Increasingly, though, participants include other USG agencies,[2] partner nations, nongovernmental organizations[3] (NGOs) such as Doctors Without Borders, private voluntary organizations[4] (PVOs) like CARE, regional and international organizations[5] such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN), and the agencies of the host country. **The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.** This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. Because **the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency**, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage the core competencies of the myriad agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The National Command Authorities (NCA) decide to employ the Armed Forces of the United States because they have deemed it necessary to use military means to meet national interests. **The use of the military element of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military often plays a supporting role to other national agencies.** Though the Department of Defense (DOD) may have little or no choice regarding the agencies engaged in a particular operation or control over the individual agency agendas, **understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment could provide the key to success in joint operations and unified actions**.

a. **A Forum of Expertise. Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table.** This diversity is the strength of the interagency process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

b. **Gathering the Right Resources. The challenge**, not only to the Nation's leadership but to commanders at all levels, **is to recognize what resources may apply to a problem and to bring them to the interagency table**. All efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies.

An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimately contribute to unity of effort. **Pursuit of coordination and cooperation in the interagency process should be viewed as a means, not an end of the process.** While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual agencies.

c. **Strategic Direction.** Coordinating the activities of the various USG agencies is fundamental to the efficient use of national resources. The US National Security Strategy defines the interaction between the Department of Defense and other organizations in such critical operations as counterterrorism, counterdrug, and humanitarian assistance. **The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff carry out most interagency coordination for the Department of Defense at the strategic level.** This coordination sets the stage for directions to commanders at the operational and tactical levels.

d. **Focus of Theater Operations.** Every joint force operation involves close coordination with forces and agencies outside the chain of command. The guidance in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," for joint force commanders (JFCs) is clear: ". . . **ensure that joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces** (multinational operations) and **nonmilitary organizations** (government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations,

THE COMBATANT COMMANDER IN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Today, the combatant commands are operating in regions where some governments cannot control their cities, regions, and principal functions and institutions. As CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appreciation of the threat must consider the consequences of instability. Countering this will require the effective combination of all the elements of national power if we are to overcome the tyranny of transnational threats and internal disorder. Interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision of peacetime engagement. The problem of "who's in charge?" still vexes interagency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency has not carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. So, then, how will interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism? Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing is the lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronize interagency effort. The executive and legislative branches have not routinely provided interagency leadership with direct control over the resources necessary for interagency operations. Decentralized operations in the field require cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives, concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to be prone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to different priorities, schedules and operating areas. Yet, as long as the CINCs are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership - even while in a supporting role.

SOURCE: William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford
Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations

international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and even the United Nations). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs and their staffs. . . ."

3. The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process

Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity at home and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase in situations — primarily overseas — in which civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats not previously confronted. With the breakdown of nation-states, there is greater need for developmental, civil assistance, and humanitarian relief organizations to alleviate human suffering. **These organizations are drawn closer to military forces by necessity, because their missions may fail without military support or protection.** For example, USAID frequently operates under host-nation (HN) or regional military protection in ways not experienced in the past, when violence was often suppressed by Cold War stability and the National Security Strategy had not placed such emphasis on USG agency operations overseas in support of national objectives. Conversely, US military forces routinely interact with other USG agencies and NGOs and PVOs to deal with the expanding civil dimension of military operations. Thus, even where military-agency relations are long-standing, the circumstances of their implementation and of US operational effectiveness are changing.

4. Systematic Integration of Procedures for Effective Cooperation

Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation. The various agencies' different — and sometimes conflicting — goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Some NGOs and PVOs may, in fact, have policies that are purposely antithetical to both the military and government agencies. Additionally, **there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and**

With the breakdown of nation-states, there is greater need for developmental, civil assistance and humanitarian relief organizations to alleviate human suffering.

procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the myriad agencies, departments, and organizations have the capability and the tools to work together. The interagency process is often described as "more art than science," while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military command and control (C2) can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency operations. **Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation**, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. In summary, **action will follow understanding**.

5. Interagency Operations at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels

Vertical and lateral integration of control mechanisms is often confusing in the interagency process. **A principal difficulty of coordinating operations between agencies is determining counterparts among them.** Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other organizations, particularly **at the operational level where there is seldom a counterpart to the geographic combatant commander**. Further, overall lead authority in foreign operations is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a US Ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for their agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure I-1 depicts comparative organizational structures using the three "levels of war" as the model.

6. The Interagency Environment

If the interagency process is to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations viewed in isolation. When the other instruments of national power — economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational — are applied, the dimensions of the effort and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. **The essence of interagency coordination is the interplay of multiple agencies with individual agendas.** This process and the divergent agency cultures typically challenge the military ethos of results orientation. Nonetheless, by understanding the interagency environment and culture, campaign and operation plans can be more adeptly crafted to synchronize the efforts of the myriad agencies and focus their core competencies synergistically toward the desired end state.

a. **Understand the Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy.** The basic precepts of the American political system distribute power to prevent any one branch from accumulating overwhelming influence over the political process. Certain powers are concentrated in the executive branch during wartime emergencies. Even then the tendency is toward diffusion, and **concentrating the powers of different agencies toward national security objectives is difficult**.

- **Core Values. Each agency has core values that it will not compromise.** These values form the foundation upon which all other functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all participants

COMPARISON OF AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

	ARMED FORCESOF THE UNITED STATES	EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES	STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT	REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)	REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL: UNITED NATIONS (UN)	NGOs AND PVOs
STRATEGIC	Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commander (1)	National Headquarters Department Secretaries	Governor	NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)	UN Headquarters Functional Headquarters (e.g., UN High Commissioner for Refugees)	National Headquarters
OPERATIONAL	Combatant Commander Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2) Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element	Ambassador/Embassy (3) Liaisons (4) Federal Coordinating Regional Office	State Adjutant General State Coordinating Officer (SCO) Office of Emergency Services (OES) Department/Agency	Major Subordinate	Special Representative to the Secretary General(6) UN Command Korea, when activated, is the only UN organization at the operational level.	(Some
TACTICAL	CJTF Component Service Functional	Ambassador/Embassy Field Office US Agency for International Development/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team Liaison (5) Response Team	National Guard County Commissioner Mayor/Manager County City (e.g., Police Department)	Principal Subordinate Commands (e.g., Allied Land Forces Southern Europe) Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Task Element Task Unit	Special Representative to the Secretary General Military Force Commander Teams Observers	Field Office in Program Country Relief Workers

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in synchronizing the application of all instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.
2. The commander, joint task force (CJTF), within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in synchronizing the application of all instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.
3. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at both the operational and tactical levels by supporting joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF.
4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) or Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the CIA liaison officer, or any specifically assigned person. Other USG agencies do not have a similar counterpart to the combatant commander.
5. USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides its rapidly deployable Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters.
6. The Special Representative to the UN Secretary General may function at both the operational and tactical levels.

Figure I-1. Comparison of Agency Organizational Structures

must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and will be maneuvering to protect its core values.

- **Insular Vision. Domestic politics are usually the single most important driver of the various USG agencies' agendas**, which may or may not coincide with international security issues. It is fortuitous, as in the Gulf War, when there is some congruency, but that is not always the case. On 16 April 1990, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) met under the leadership of Robert Gates to reconsider the US policy toward Iraq. Because of Iraq's recent actions, there was a proposal to stop the government-guaranteed rice and other grains sales and government-backed Export-Import Bank credits. Some USG agencies argued that the credit programs should go forward because "all we would be doing is hurting US rice producers and the US firms looking for business." The DOS wanted to continue the credits regardless of the intelligence reports about Iraq so as not to "tie the administration's hands."

- **Reduction of Uncertainty. Most bureaucracies try to routinize their operation and few are optimized for crisis management.** Crisis increases uncertainty and the likelihood that compromises will have to be made. With compromise may come the fear that power, security, or prestige may be sacrificed. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will struggle to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty and an organization's power. **Thus information is the coin of the realm in interagency operations, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.**

- **Individual Agendas. Private agendas can significantly affect interagency consensus.** The goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short-term, agendas of its members. Because personality plays such a large part in interagency operations, personal agendas can be significant — often even creating an informal hierarchy of the department or agency. **All organizations have some sort of formal and informal hierarchy,** which results

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in World War II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitions of the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the Allied Powers under his command were critical toward making the coalition work.

General Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia's Lieutenant General Khaled were able to forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere that permeated both of their staffs and impacted on every action and every decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstruction of Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation and establish subordinate interagency support based largely on personal relationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, USAR, who put the organization together,

was also the senior analyst in the Near East Division of the DOS's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, Edward "Skip" Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major Andres Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, a contractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAID and its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these personal relationships.

Personal relationships have dominated interagency operations from Landsdale and Magsaysay in the Philippines, to Duarte and Pickering, Corr and Woerner in El Salvador. Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of the Ambassador, the geographic combatant commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the USG departments and agencies to personally work together.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

in a specific distribution of power, income, and prestige among the members of the organization. Informal structures are created to serve the personal needs of the organization's members and tend to modify the organization's overall behavior pattern. Informal structures inherent in every organization contribute significantly to its ability to perform formal functions. Thus, developing an understanding of an organization and of the personalities involved in its informal structure can provide insight to how the organization performs.

b. **Gain Consensus Within the Department of Defense.** Before attempting to gain **consensus** in the interagency arena, it **must first be attained in the Department of Defense**. The various elements — Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands — should agree to the ends, ways, and means of an operation before trying to integrate the military instrument of power with other agencies, departments, and organizations. The Department of Defense has a common culture, common procedures, and a hierarchical structure, and the Armed Forces of the United States possess **unique capabilities**.

- **Influence** — This occurs both domestically and internationally, through military-to-military contacts and through the Reserve and National Guard.

- **Resources** — No other organization could have accomplished the massive logistic and engineer feats of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

- **Responsiveness** — Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, SEA ANGEL, RESTORE HOPE, and PROMOTE LIBERTY are all examples of the demonstrated ability to organize and project massive resources quickly to any spot on the globe.

- **Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence** — The ability to command, control, communicate, and assimilate intelligence globally, both on the ground and from space, is unparalleled.

- **Organizing and Planning Processes** — The ability to conduct crisis planning and organize crisis response is unique.

- **Training Support** — The capability to train large numbers of individuals quickly is unequaled.

- **Strategic and Theater Lift** — Only the Armed Forces of the United States have the capability to rapidly project overwhelming military power anywhere on the globe in support of US national security objectives.

(See also Figure A-C-4, Volume II.)

c. **Develop an Understanding of Other Agencies, Departments, and Organizations.**

- Other Federal agencies can see the ends, ways, and means differently than does the Department of Defense. **Even though the ends may be agreed to by all** (as they are in the counterdrug war), **the ways and the means may differ from agency to agency**. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies. Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies' cultures. What one agency views as "by the book," another may see as "slow and bureaucratic"; "fast and loose" to one is "flexible and responsive" to another. **Interagency participants should understand that agencies are often guided by their unique cultures** (to include the Armed Forces of the United States) and that an appreciation of these cultural differences and of other agencies' priorities, procedures, capabilities, and terminology will pay dividends during interagency coordination and execution. Understanding the significance that each organizational culture plays in successful interagency coordination can help effect workable compromise and thus integrate all of the elements of national power.

- NGOs, PVOs, and some regional and international organizations present yet another kind of challenge. Working with NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations requires a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity. None of these organizations will normally accept taskings or direction from outside, and few coordinate their activities with others unless there is an organizational need to do so. This fact is particularly true when the coordination may constrain normal operating procedures or reduce flexibility. **Because they are not part of the government, they may be hostile toward it or unwilling to share its vision or goals.** These organizations may embrace a set of principles that is at odds with the thrust of military operations. However, their expertise may be essential to the successful accomplishment of the mission. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT provides an example of growing cooperation between the Armed Forces of the United States and the humanitarian relief community as the operation unfolded.

- **Each agency, department, and organization has different access and a different perspective on the international scene.** This difference can result in a dysfunctional approach to security issues. Determining the desired end states in Panama, Kuwait, and the Kurdish areas illustrated the inherent challenge to achieving unity of effort when different organizations had distinct visions. (Appendix J of this publication, "Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies/The Mohonk Criteria," contains criteria developed by the World Conference on Religion and Peace for addressing disasters. It may provide commanders with a better understanding of the philosophy of the international relief community and thus furnish insight into conducting military operations in concert with these organizations.)

d. **Establish Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on a unifying goal is the most important prerequisite for successful interagency operations.** Consensus is frail and must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and often results in a Presidential Decision Directive explaining the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure that everyone has a stake in the outcome. **Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus.** The greater the number of agencies and the more diversified the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. A crisis — such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the plight of the Kurds, the flooding of Bangladesh, or the tragedy of Oklahoma City — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and consensus can be reached. Because a common unifying goal is so important, **a great deal of time is spent on clarifying and restating the goals**. General Devers wrote that clarifying the directives of higher headquarters and dealing with the political, economic, and military policies of each of the allied powers in World War II was a major task for the theater commander. Because a common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many of the techniques that have been developed in coalition operations can be used to facilitate interagency operations.

Successful interagency operations require a consensus on a unifying goal.

e. **Determine Mutual Needs and Develop Interdependence.** After developing an understanding of other agencies, **determine the mutual needs between the Department of Defense and each of the other agencies**. What things are important both to the Department of Defense and to other organizations? The answer can help define the common ground among agencies, departments, and organizations in pursuit of mutual interests. All organizations will strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values. These must be considered to ensure total interagency cooperation. **Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is the strongest and the most lasting potential bond between agencies, departments, and organizations.** NGOs and PVOs most effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia with the security provided by the US Armed Forces. The US Armed Forces cannot conduct a long-range deployment without the

DOS securing overflight and en route basing agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a framework for cooperation. These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the way to true interagency cooperation. **Ensuring that all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition strengthens these bonds of interdependence.** The purpose of such recognition is to wed all of the engaged agencies to the process by validating and reinforcing their positive interagency participation. (The following appendixes in this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations: Appendix A, "US Government Agencies," Appendix B, "Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations," Appendix C, "Regional and International Organizations," Appendix D, "Agency Capabilities and Resources - Quick Look," and Appendix H, "Interagency Telephone and Facsimile Number Listing,")

f. **Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately.** Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing relationship in deference to the issue at hand. At the strategic level of war, the combatant commander may work with political committees or through the Secretary of Defense (in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) who participates at NSC and ministerial-level discussions, setting long-term policy goals. The combatant commander will also confront short-term operational objectives and coordinate with the Ambassador and country team or a multinational and interagency staff or task force. **Long- and short-term objectives should have connectivity and the combatant commander must organize the command to deal with each successfully.**

7. Building Interagency Coordination

Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," identifies the requirement for interagency coordination as a function of military operations in both war and MOOTW: ". . . combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US Ambassadors, the DOS, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power."

BUILDING AN UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY

Not only do UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations not understand the military organization, we likewise do not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions as to our capabilities, and little or no understanding of our limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the US military personnel did not realize that those organizations do not have a real chain of command as we are used to — we simply never had any idea who to listen to . . . and they lacked one voice that could speak for all subordinates.

SOURCE: Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review, Headquarters, USEUCOM

While Chapter III of this publication details "organizing for successful interagency operations," the following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination.

a. **Define the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms That Are Agreed To By All.** Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. Representatives from each major group of agencies, departments, and organizations — to include field offices — should be involved in all levels of planning from the outset. These representatives are especially important in order to achieve unity of effort during this problem definition phase. **The early development of options for interagency consideration is necessary.** These options may be developed by creating an interagency assessment team capable of quick dispatch to the crisis area to work with the combatant commander, Ambassador(s), or local and state authorities, to assess the situation.

b. **Define the Objective.** Within the context of interagency operations, **commanders and decision makers should seek clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives, end state, and exit criteria**. Successful interagency coordination is essential to achieve these goals and the development of accurate and timely assessments. Such definition allows application of resources of the most appropriate agencies. **Not all agencies will necessarily understand or agree to the need to clearly define the objective with the sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.** For example, the DOS may appear to resist defining the objective, since from its perspective doing so might inhibit the give-and-take necessary to resolve the problems that are associated with many operations. From the DOS viewpoint, the objective may emerge clearly only in the course of negotiations and may not be established in complete detail beforehand. This example is an illustration of the cultural differences referred to previously. Complications can arise because each agency has its own perspective, capabilities, and culture. **This diversity is the strength and not the weakness of the interagency process.** While there may be disagreement about solutions, the differences provide a broad range of options that can be applied.

c. **Establish a Common Frame of Reference.** The interagency environment is complicated by differences in key terminology. The meaning of the terms "safe zone" or "neutral" to a joint force commander may have completely different connotations to another agency head. The operational impact of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. **The semantic differences commonly experienced between Services grows markedly in the interagency arena. To mitigate this problem, military planners must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage.** A good start is to provide common access to Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." This clarification is particularly important to the establishment of military objectives. Differing operating procedures, bureaucratic cultures, and language differences can create similar problems during multinational operations.

d. **Develop Courses of Action or Options.** These should address the problem and achieve the objectives. **Military planners should focus their efforts on the military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.** Resource-sensitive problems require good options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly impractical options or recommending the "middle of the road" approach merely for

the sake of achieving consensus is of little service to decision makers. The synergism of open debate within the interagency community produces the best options.

e. **Capitalize on Experience**. Review the after-action reports and lessons learned using the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System or the reports of such organizations as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Air Force Center for Lessons Learned, Coast Guard Universal Lessons Learned System, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, and Center for Naval Analyses to assess proposed courses of action and to reduce the requirement to learn on the job. Though usually less formal, agencies outside the Department of Defense frequently have their own systems in place to capitalize on operational experience. These should be sought and used whenever possible.

f. **Establish Responsibility. When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will do what through policy-operations coordination, a common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution help achieve unity of effort**. The resources required for a mission must be painstakingly identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibility assigned to the agencies that will provide them. To receive proper reimbursement from other USG agencies for materiel support, **careful responsibility and accounting procedures should be established**. Cooperation and synchronization are achieved when interagency coordination allows consideration of all positions. The military planner or commander's voice may be but one among many at the interagency table.

g. **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities and Functions.** Prior to engagement of military forces, **it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities**. This planning must begin at the national level. When interagency transition planning (including assignment of specific responsibilities and timelines for accomplishment) does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. Recent positive examples illustrate this point; in Rwanda, the provision of potable water was critical to saving thousands of lives. While the US Armed Forces perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines and procedures for transitioning from military support to NGO and PVO control. In Haiti the well-conceived transition planning, performed as part of overall interagency coordination, provided for superb transition execution and management. This transition enabled the US Armed Forces to hand over responsibility for key tasks to other agencies, departments, and organizations in a virtually seamless manner. **As campaign and operation plans are developed at the operational level, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration.** Particularly during MOOTW, commanders and military planners at this level should anticipate the need to "ratchet down" US military support to lessen the impact on the local populace of transitioning to other organizations.

h. **Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort.** Achieving unity of effort is complicated by the number of participants, distinctive agency cultures, lack of definitive command arrangements among the agencies, and often differing objectives. **The principle of unity of effort pertains not only to military operations but also to interagency coordination.** Unity will lead to success for the mission, not a zero-sum equation among

the agencies. Achieving this principle begins by identifying agencies that have the requisite capabilities to reach the common objective and by bringing their core competencies to the interagency forum. Because the Department of Defense will often be in a supporting and not in the lead or supported role in this process, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. The NSC staff normally designates the lead agency[6] for situations in which the Department of Defense will participate, but lead agency responsibility can be situationally dependent, with the NSC staff setting the agenda. Among USG agencies, a charter enables the NSC to discharge responsibilities with the active support of others assigned to the problem. **While not inviolate, the principle of lead agency is applied to a variety of functions requiring interagency coordination.** Application of the principle is not limited to national-level coordination. It can be applied at the tactical level with counterpart agencies such as government field offices and local law enforcement agencies. It is important to determine details about the agencies and organizations that have an active role in the issue at hand to ensure that those requiring information receive it and those that have information provide it.

8. Media Impact on Interagency Coordination

The formulation and execution of any national security policy must consider the public's traditional values if the policy is to be successful. As a result, **the media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development**. The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency process — whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as NGOs and PVOs vie for public attention and necessary charitable contributions. **Military plans that include interaction with other agencies should anticipate the importance that public affairs and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process.** As early as possible in the planning process, all participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment. Common communication points and public affairs themes should be developed prior to execution of the plan so that organizations are not perceived by the media as working at cross-purposes with one another. Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that, to the extent possible, the media hears from a single voice.

1 Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged USG agencies, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

2 USG agencies and departments are those operating within the Federal Government's executive branch. These include the NCA, Department of Defense, the various elements of the NSC System and NSC staff, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), USAID, and many more.

3 "Nongovernmental organization" refers to a transnational, nonprofit organization of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance (development and relief). Nongovernmental organization is a term normally used by non-US organizations. Also called NGO.

4 "Private voluntary organization" refers to a private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organization involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally US-based. The term "private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with nongovernmental organization. Also called PVO.

5 Regional and international organizations are those with regional or global influence.

6 A lead agency coordinates the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. Lead agencies are designated among USG agencies, normally by a Presidential Decision Directive, through the NSC or its associated forums, or based on traditional functional linkage (e.g., DOS for foreign policy matters). The lead agency chairs the NSC interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency also determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among other agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions.

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CHAPTER II
ESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

"What's the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Interagency Connectivity

Response to the challenges facing the Nation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings the many diverse skills and resources of the Federal Government and other public and private organizations to bear. While the requirement for coordination between the agencies is not new, the need to use all capabilities is growing with the complexity and multidimensional nature of the new world order and with shrinking military resources. **This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency involvement, building upon both the differences in agency cultures and the core competencies and successful experiences that each brings to the forum.** What follows is a discussion of the foundation and beginnings of the interagency process within the Federal Government, flowing downward to the state and local governments and combatant commands and outward to the NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations. A sampling of statutory, regulatory, or other conditions demonstrates organizational connectivity between agencies, from the top down. While portions of this chapter are described in other joint publications, this material is brought together here to provide a common frame of reference that reflects all levels of interagency involvement.

2. Interagency Coordination at the National Level

The interagency process at the national level is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47). The National Security Council is a product of NSA 47.

a. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1919 proposal for a "Joint Plan-Making Body" to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

b. Previous efforts had failed for lack of a national-level perspective, no staff for continuity, failure to properly understand the need for interagency coordination, and the parochial interests of individual agencies. Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not even invited to War Council meetings), a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

c. From the earliest days of this Nation, the President was charged by the Constitution with the national security. **The intent of NSA 47 was to assist the President in executing the authority to protect the United States.** Most current USG interagency actions flow from these beginnings.

d. Within the constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level may be based more on personalities than process and may consist more of persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building than of strict adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

3. National Security Council System (NSCS)

The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC are set forth in NSA 47 (as amended) and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 2. **They organize the NSCS as the principal forum for consideration of national security issues requiring Presidential decisions.** The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, **the NSCS provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC is the only level of the Executive Branch at which authoritative direction to the various departments can be given.**

a. **NSC Membership.** The members of the NSC are both prescribed by statute and identified in PDD-2. **The President chairs the NSC.** Other statutory members are the Vice President, the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) regularly attends meetings as a Cabinet-level officer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is a statutory advisor and also attends meetings of the NSC. The 20 January 1993 PDD-2 added the Secretary of Treasury, the US Representative (with Ambassador status) to the UN, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Advisor), the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President as permanent members. Heads of executive departments and agencies and other senior officials may be invited to attend meetings of the NSC on an ad hoc basis. For example, the Attorney General is invited when meetings pertain to the jurisdiction of the DOJ or when legal opinions may be necessary regarding such matters as covert activities or international law.

b. **NSC Organization. The NSC staff is the President's personal and principal staff for national security issues.** It tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President. Depending on the President's and the National Security Advisor's desires, the NSC staff does not implement but may take either a central role, a coordinating role, or a monitoring role in policy and option development. The 20 January 1993 PDD-2 identifies **three primary interagency groups within the NSCS**. Participation among USG agencies in the NSCS and these subgroups are depicted in Figure II-1. The groups include the following:

- **The NSC Principals Committee** (NSC/PC) is the senior interagency forum for national security policy issues.
- **The NSC Deputies Committee** (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet (deputy secretary level) interagency forum. Its participants mirror the groups represented in the NSC/PC.
- **The NSC Interagency Working Groups** (NSC/IWGs) develop policy as issues work their way to the President and, after the President's decision, ensure proper implementation. The IWG is an important tool for identifying and assessing the diverse interests of

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES

NSC SYSTEM	PARTICIPANTS: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	JOINT STAFF	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH**
NSC	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, DIR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, US REP TO UN, SEC OF TREAS, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL***
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, DCI, US REP TO UN, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, ET AL***
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE	UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY OR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	UNDER OR ASSISTANT SECSTATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS	DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, OTHER DEPUTIES
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP	ASST OR DEPUTY ASST SECRETARY*	DIRECTOR/VICE DIRECTOR	DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECSTATE	APPROPRIATE DEPUTY/UNDER SECRETARIES
WORKING GROUPS	OFFICE OF THE ASST SECRETARY ACTION OFFICER	JOINT STAFF ACTION OFFICER	DESK OFFICER	US GOVERNMENT AGENCY ACTION OFFICER

* Office of the Secretary of Defense representatives at interagency working groups may be Assistant Secretaries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Directors, or Task Force Directors/Members

** A brief listing of other executive branch participants

*** Invited as appropriate

Figure II-1. Participation in National Security Council System Activities

executive departments and agencies and for disseminating decisions, positions, and information to key participants. An IWG can extend its capabilities by forming and dispatching assessment teams to evaluate the situation. IWGs are formed in various ways. PDD-2 establishes standing IWGs for specific purposes as issues or crises arise and/or to develop long-term strategies. **Normally tasked with the day-to-day coordination of policy and issues, IWGs are sometimes augmented by executive committees**, chaired by a director from the NSC staff and similarly represented by other agencies (to include a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a flag officer). Figure II-2 depicts the mechanism for convening interagency working groups.

•• **Top-down direction may come as a result of a rapidly developing crisis.** The President requests the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. It reviews the situation, determines a preliminary course of action, and assigns tasks for each executive agency. Details of the IWG's role are identified at this time.



Figure II-2. Convening Interagency Working Groups

•• **Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives.** Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) outline specific agency interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch. IWGs integrate the various interests of the agencies into coherent responses. This process is especially likely in a new administration.

•• National security issues referred from the White House, executive departments or agencies, or the NSCS to the NSC staff may result in directives from the Executive Secretary of the NSC to convene an IWG. A directive will normally identify (1) the nature of the issue; (2) the output of the IWG (e.g., a study, recommendations, options); (3) all established national policies and emerging interests; (4) the level of representation desired from agencies; (5) a timetable; (6) an agency or department to chair; and (7) a meeting place and schedule.

c. **Determination of NSC Interest.** Conditions that may trigger escalation to the NSC include the following:

- The potential for Presidential interest.
- Disagreement among agencies or departments that cannot otherwise be resolved.
- An issue exceeding the limits on the authority of the collective group addressing the issue.
- An NSC staff request that the matter be addressed within the NSCS.

d. **The DOD Role in the NSCS**

- **Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.** The Military Departments, which implement but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process, are represented primarily by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- **The NSCS is the channel for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC (and its members).** At NSC meetings the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents personal views as well as divergent views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if any, and those of the combatant commanders.

e. **The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS**

- **The Joint Staff provides operational input and staff support through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or designee) for policy decisions made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.** It coordinates with the combatant commanders and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for Secretary of Defense approval. This preparation includes definition of command and interagency relationships.
- **Many military activities require interagency coordination**, which the Joint Staff routinely accomplishes with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State (with many involved offices and bureaus), Central Intelligence Agency, NSC Staff, Department of Justice, USAID, and others, depending on the circumstances. **There are times when the combatant commander may also directly participate in accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP).** Within the Joint Staff, the offices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), and Plans and Policy (J-5) Directorates are focal points for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4 assesses logistics implications of contemplated operations from its logistics readiness center (LRC) to the interagency forum, and the J-5 often serves to focus the Department of Defense on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of the Joint Staff directorates coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. The Secretary of Defense may also designate one of the Services as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

f. **The Combatant Commands' Role in the NSCS.** While the combatant commanders function under the Secretary of

Defense in accordance with the UCP, **the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represents the concerns of the combatant commanders in the NSCS**. These concerns are determined through direct communications between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders and their respective staffs. The combatant commanders often directly communicate with the committees and groups of the NSCS, just as the Joint Staff routinely deals with intradepartmental issues. The formulation of military advice and the representation of joint force concerns will be accomplished by members of the Joint Staff through coordination with the combatant command. Intradepartmental and policy interests of the Department of Defense are represented by the appropriate members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

4. Forming a Joint Task Force (JTF)

Combatant commanders play a pivotal role in the politics of military intervention. **When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, a combatant commander may designate a JTF to conduct the military operation.** The combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon the direction of the NCA and communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Input from the Department of State, USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and others, as well as the situation and the time military forces will enter the joint operations area (JOA), may affect the mission statement. The combatant commander determines the necessary military capabilities based upon mission analysis and tasks the components to identify forces for specified capabilities. Components establish a force list (personnel, equipment, and supplies) and associated movement requirements to support the operation. **In coordination with the commander, joint task force (CJTF), the combatant commander will determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission, allocate or request the military forces, and determine the command relationships for the JTF.**

a. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF concept provides for organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission's requirements and the unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional components, and provides for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. **The mission assigned a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly, the support of all types of agencies.** Generally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations, with a commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF headquarters (HQ) is command, control, synchronization, and administration of the JTF. The CJTF has at least two responsibilities usually associated with those of combatant commanders: the requirement for unified action in the CJTF's JOA and the necessity to interface with USG and HN agencies.

b. **JTFs in the Interagency Process. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction and decentralized execution.** The unique aspects of the interagency process require the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF's components but those of other agencies, as well. **The JTF HQ is the operational focal point for interagency coordination,**

whereas the Joint Staff serves as the military's national-level focal point. Accordingly, the CJTF may find it necessary to expand the JTF staff to accommodate the additional requirements. The flexibility associated with JTF organization makes it possible to put some kind of military and/or political structure or staff into the JTF.

5. Interagency Coordination: Domestic[1] Operations

a. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in many respects, may include military support to civil authorities (MSCA), which provides DOD support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies that result from natural or manmade causes, or military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). MSCLEA includes but is not limited to military assistance to civil disturbances, Key Asset Protection Program, and interagency assistance, to include training support to law enforcement agencies, support to counterdrug operations, support for combatting terrorism, and improvised device response.

b. **Crisis response to natural disasters and civil defense needs inside the United States are implemented through the Federal Response Plan (FRP).** The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93-288, as amended), is the statutory authority for USG domestic disaster assistance. It gives the President the authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response which is delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as the type and amount of Federal assistance available. Twenty-eight Federal departments and agencies support the operations of the FRP through execution of their assigned functional responsibilities.

"Disaster relief operations in support of the state of Florida following Hurricane Andrew in August 1992 included military personnel from all Services, active and reserve components, various nongovernmental service organizations (Red Cross, United Way and the Salvation Army), religious organizations of all types, state and local governments, other Federal government organizations (including FEMA, Department of Transportation and many others), contractors by the thousands, and tens of thousands of individual volunteers who all worked together to help the citizens of southern Florida begin on the road to recovery."

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA

Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994

c. **The FRP applies to natural disasters** such as earthquakes, forest fires, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, floods, and volcanic eruptions; **technological emergencies** involving radiological or hazardous material releases; **and other Federal emergencies** identified under the act.

d. Following a request for assistance from the Governor of the affected state or territory and the determination that local ability to respond has been exceeded, **the President implements the FRP by declaring a domestic disaster**. With this Presidential declaration, the resources of the Federal Government — through the interagency process — can be focused on restoring normalcy.

e. **The FRP assigns responsibilities to executive departments and agencies in grouped emergency support functions,**

(ESFs) depending on the situation. Agencies are designated as "primary" or "support," based on their core competencies in 12 ESFs in the FRP. (See Annex J, Appendix A of this publication, "Federal Emergency Management Agency," and its Figure A-J-2.)

f. **DOD policy is set forth in DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities** (MSCA)." While the Secretary of Defense retains the authority to approve the use of combatant command resources for MSCA, **the Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense Executive Agent for executing and managing MSCA** and responds to the NCA when coordinating with the Director of FEMA. Under the FRP, the Department of Defense has the responsibility as "Primary Agency" for Public Works & Engineering (ESF #3). As a primary agency, the Department of Defense plans, coordinates, and manages the Federal response required by this function. The Department of Defense also has specific responsibilities as a "Support Agency" for all other ESFs. For additional information see Joint Pub 3-07.7, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations."

g. **The Secretary of Defense must approve the employment of combatant command resources for MSCA.** The Secretary of the Army may assign tasks directly to the combatant commanders, the Military Departments, DOD agencies, and the Army Corps of Engineers. **The Secretary of the Army executes and manages MSCA operations through the Director of Military Support (DOMS).** Navy and Air Force Deputies support DOMS to ensure optimum Service integration. Recent examples of DOMS leadership include DOD support to relief activities associated with Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki; the 1994 Los Angeles earthquake; and the 1994 Northwest fires.

h. **The Secretary of Defense personally oversees DOD responses to acts of terrorism.** Using the Joint Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Secretary of Defense with operational management of such responses. DOMS assists the Secretary of Defense with managing the consequences of a terrorist incident.

i. **Federal assistance to a state or territory is provided under the overall direction of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), appointed by FEMA** on behalf of the President after the President has declared a "disaster." In coordination with the state, FEMA will send in the Emergency Response Team (ERT) consisting of selected Federal agency representatives to assess damage, establish the disaster field office (DFO) and work at the state emergency operations center. **All taskings (known as "mission assignments") must be approved by FEMA's FCO in order for the Department of Defense to be reimbursed for its incremental costs for the mission.** When a domestic disaster occurs, FEMA's Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) and Emergency Support Team (EST) form at the Agency's headquarters. The CDRG is the coordinating group that addresses policy issues and support requirements from the FCO and ESF response elements in the field. The EST is an interagency group composed of representatives from the ten primary Federal agencies (including the Department of Defense) and the FEMA staff to resolve issues.

j. **Acting through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DOMS** (the Department of Defense representative on the CDRG), the Secretary of Defense approves **an execute order designating the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM)** (for disasters in the 48 continental states and Puerto Rico)

or **the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC)** (for disasters in Alaska, Hawaii, or the Pacific territories) **as the supported combatant commander and operating agent**. The execute order also delineates support relationships; directs the US Army Corps of Engineers to begin disaster site support; and directs Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) to begin unit or equipment movement as required by the supported combatant commander. Acting through DOMS, the Secretary of the Army tasks and coordinates with the Services and other DOD elements (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency), in accordance with support requirements identified by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) or other primary agencies under the Federal Response Plan and with the mission assigned by FEMA. **USCINCACOM and USCINCPAC are DOD principal planning agents.** They have the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime assistance rendered by the Department of Defense within their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs).

k. **The supported combatant commander designates a component command as a headquarters to execute the disaster relief operation. This headquarters will appoint and deploy a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)** and, based on the severity of the situation, may also deploy a joint task force. The DCO works with the FCO to integrate JTF efforts in support of the operation. The DCO serves as the on-scene military point of contact for the FCO and principal representatives of other USG agencies participating in the relief operation. As a practical guide, the DCO and CJTF are not the same individual because they have different responsibilities and assets. The separation of these distinct functions allows the commander the flexibility to operate freely in the disaster area, while the DCO focuses on task validation and coordinating DOD response activities in the disaster field office. **Within the continental United States (CONUS), USCINCACOM through its Army Component Forces Command or the Continental United States Army (CONUSA)[2] can provide the JTF HQ.** The CONUSAs are Army regionally oriented commands with regional boundaries. These headquarters interact on a daily basis with state and local authorities, the FEMA regions, and other Federal agencies on a variety of issues that provide a foundation for rapid and smooth transition to support operations during periods of disaster response. FEMA provides supporting combatant commanders with interface to Federal agencies through Regional Interagency Steering Committees for planning, coordinating, and supporting MSCA efforts. FEMA has adopted the Incident Command System organizational model (see Figure II-3) for the interagency ERT, which includes the functional elements of operations, planning, logistics, and finance and/or administration.

l. **In addition to crisis response roles in civil disasters, DOD assistance may be requested from other agencies as part of a Federal response to domestic environmental disasters.** Normally, such assistance will be provided based on requests from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US Coast Guard (USCG), or Department of the Interior (DOI) as the lead agency. The Yellowstone forest fires of 1988 and the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 are examples of disasters in which the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces played a significant role. Other examples include flooding and radiological and hazardous material accidents or incidents.

m. While the Department of Defense response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through DOMS, **the military may also respond when an interdepartmental memorandum of agreement (MOA) is in effect**. For example,



Figure II-3. Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Command System

the USCG (DOT) is assured of a rapid response from the US Navy in the deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment to the scene of an oil spill by an interdepartmental MOA. This MOA sets forth procedures for deployment of equipment and personnel, and for reimbursement of operational costs. Because of this MOA, negotiations at the headquarters level are not required. This mechanism enabled the rapid deployment of Navy equipment to Prince William Sound in 1989 in response to the Exxon Valdez incident and preceded the much greater DOD assistance effort orchestrated by DOMS.

n. In all of these efforts, the military brings unique and very useful capabilities to the interagency forum that have value in domestic support. However, **the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all bear on the employment of the military in domestic operations**. US law provides authority for

and defines the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. **Passive activities of military authorities that incidentally aid civilian law enforcement agencies are not prohibited.** However, with the exception of members of the Coast Guard[3] and members of the National Guard in state service, **military personnel are prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil laws in the United States** that includes the following:

- Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.
- Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit.
- Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

o. **Operations within the United States are differentiated from other types of military operations. Military commanders must seek a legal review of domestic operation plans.** They should scrutinize each request for aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory limits, especially in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense must personally approve any request to assist law enforcement agencies that will result in a planned event with the potential for confrontation with named individuals and/or groups or use of lethal force. Considering the increased emphasis on domestic roles for the Department of Defense, a balance must be defined during the planning phase, with the military capabilities and resources that can be applied to a situation on the one hand and the constraints of law on the other.

p. Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses the different and complementary capabilities of each Service to accomplish the mission in disaster assistance. **The JTF should be capable of providing any emergency assistance.** All classes of supply and all types of services may be required. The designation of a JTF will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response to the disaster. Frequently, it will involve nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources. The JTF will be specifically configured for each mission. **In disaster situations, the JTF will be composed of predominantly combat support and combat service support units.**

6. Coordination With State and Local Authorities

DOD interaction with state and local authorities can take the very visible form of MSCA or the more routine involvement of commanders of DOD installations with state, county, and municipal governments. These activities include contingency planning with local governments and field offices of Federal agencies and community and social activities.

a. **The Governor is supported in a contingency by the state or territorial Army and Air National Guard** under the command of the state or territory Adjutant General. DOD support is generally provided in the form of assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to a Federal agency field office or to a state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.

b. **Each of the states and territories has an office of emergency services (OES)** or an equivalent responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the Governor in directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial assistance to its local governments through

authority of the Governor or Adjutant General but does not provide cross-border assistance. Additionally, the state will usually designate a State Coordinating Officer (SCO), with similar authorities to the FCO, to coordinate and integrate Federal and state activities.

c. Counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and SCO are established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination. For example, local DOD installation commanders may work closely with local mayors and commissioners to align capabilities and resources with needs.

d. **Federal support to law enforcement agencies can be coordinated with the state or territory Adjutant General, the OES, or principal law enforcement agency, depending on the nature and magnitude of the operation.** Coordination of counterdrug operations under Federal and state oversight can be very low-key, with interagency activities taking place within specific localities. Such an operation occurred along the Saint Lawrence River in the 1980s to stop the illegal flow of drugs and cigarettes. The US Customs Service (USCS), US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state and local police worked together, along with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other agencies of both governments. In a different sort of operation, support provided during the Los Angeles riots required extensive coordination at several echelons, from the Adjutant General to local law enforcement departments and DOD installations.

e. **DOD support for local environmental operations can begin immediately within the authority delegated to installation commanders.** One such example is detection of an oil spill in a harbor. If requested by local authorities, a commander of a DOD installation having the appropriate resources can take immediate action, with coordination of state and Federal activities to follow. This immediate response by commanders will not take precedence over their primary mission. Commanders should seek guidance through the chain of command regarding continuing assistance whenever DOD resources are committed under immediate response circumstances.

f. DOD coordination of activities between installations and the local community can include support for public fire and rescue services, public works, police protection, social services, public health, and hospitals. Routine interagency coordination between the Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the municipality takes place on a daily basis where a joint-use military airfield supports commercial aviation serving the municipality. Examples include military assistance to safety and traffic and search and rescue.

g. Interagency coordination with domestic PVOs such as the American Red Cross is carried out between the Federal Government, the agencies, and the affected state or territory.

7. Interagency Coordination: Foreign Operations

a. **Politico-Military Domain.** The Department of State advises and assists the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. **Day-to-day relationships between Federal agencies revolve about the Nation's external relationships and how they bear on the national interest.** For the Department of Defense (in the politico-military domain) this involves the following:

- Bilateral and multilateral military relationships.
- Treaties involving DOD interests.
- Technology transfer.
- Armaments cooperation and control.

- Humanitarian assistance.

- Peace operations (including those conducted under the auspices of the UN).

b. **Theater Orientation.** Within a theater, **the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination**. Coordination between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies may occur in a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General may be involved. The combatant commander's regional focus is mirrored at the Department of State in its regional bureaus. Similarly, many other USG agencies are regionally organized (e.g., USAID and United States Information Agency [USIA]). Within individual countries, the Ambassador and country team are the initial focal point. (See Annex C ["DOD"] and Annex F ["Department of State"] in Appendix A ["US Government Agencies"] of this publication.)

"Interaction with the US Department of State and the United Nations was critical throughout the operation. Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR sector. His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS."

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA
Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army: Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994

c. **Campaign Planning Within Interagency Operations.** The joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or end state and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve objectives. Thus, **a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state**. Such a plan enables commanders to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives. Given the systematic military approach to problem solving, it is often the combatant commander who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations. **How does the combatant commander develop and execute a campaign plan in the interagency arena,** in which his command authority is limited and the military element of national power is often the least dominant?

- Operational art lies at the heart of how a combatant commander produces campaign plans designed to meet strategic objectives. **The combatant commander must consider four significant areas.**

  •• **Ends.** What conditions will achieve the theater strategic objectives?

  •• **Ways.** What sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions?

  •• **Means.** How does the commander apply resources to accomplish this sequence of actions?

  •• **Risk.** What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing this sequence of actions?

- **To frame the campaign plan within interagency operations, the commander must address these four**

areas in the context of all of the elements of national power, to include political and/or diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Then, although choice may be limited, the combatant commander must consider which agencies are best qualified to wield these elements of power. **The campaign plan within interagency operations should integrate the elements of national power by synchronizing the efforts and optimizing the varied and extensive resources of many agencies and organizations toward a single objective or end state.**

d. **Plan Development and Coordination.** Combatant commanders frequently develop courses of action with recommendations and considerations originating in one or more US embassies. In this regard, **the country team can be an invaluable resource, because each embassy is required to develop and maintain a current Emergency Action Plan (EAP).** These EAPs, which can cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises, can assist the combatant commanders in identifying courses of action, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities. More importantly, the EAP incorporates the inputs of those representatives with significant experience on the ground. The staffs of geographic combatant commands also consult with embassy country teams as well as with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and key interagency offices to coordinate military operations and support activities with those of other organizations. **Initial concepts of military operations may require revision based on feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities by voluntary and private organizations, particularly with regard to logistics.** For example, primitive seaport and airport facilities may limit the ability to move massive amounts of supplies and constrain application of the collective effort. Such information frequently originates within the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Thus, directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with other USG agencies, NGOs, and PVOs to identify and minimize mutual interference.

- **Mission planning** conducted by the geographic combatant commander **should be coordinated with the Department of State, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,** to facilitate definition and clarification of strategic aims, end state, and the means to achieve them. Commanders and planners should understand specific conditions that could produce mission failure, as well as those that mark success. Commanders must ensure that unity of effort with other agencies contributes to strategic aims and objectives.

- **During campaign planning, the command should identify the target audiences to be reached.** The JTF public affairs officer (PAO) must coordinate with civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), intelligence community, and NGOs and PVOs to develop and package themes, mission, and end state. **The desired end state, essential tasks leading up to the end state, and exit criteria must be clearly expressed to the media in order to gain and maintain public support.** The various agencies involved in campaign planning do not necessarily send the same messages and must not contradict each other. Agencies and organizations must determine and coordinate the best methods to communicate these messages.

- Mission refinement can help commanders assist NGO and PVO activities. The goal should not be to

replace these activities. This may include, for example, providing convoy security or transporting relief supplies.

(For a detailed description of these key interagency-intensive operations, see the following appendices of this publication: Appendix E, "Counterdrug Operations — Interagency Coordination," Appendix F, "Foreign Disaster Assistance — Interagency Coordination," and Appendix G, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations — Interagency Coordination.")

8. Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries

The chief of mission (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority over all elements of the US Government in country, except forces assigned to a combatant command.[4] Other key USG organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) and the Security Assistance Organizations (SAO) — both part of the country team. In some countries these two functions may be performed by a single military office. It is important to understand the differences between these agencies in theater interagency coordination.

a. **The Ambassador.** As discussed, **the Ambassador is the senior representative of the President in foreign nations** and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The Ambassador integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the country team. As the chief of mission, the Ambassador has extraordinary authority and a de facto coordinating mechanism that

COUNTRY TEAM

The United States country team is "the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission." (Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Directory of Military and Associated Terms.") It includes representatives of all US departments and agencies present in the country. The US Ambassador, synonymous with chief of mission, represents the President but takes policy guidance from the SECSTATE through regional bureaus. The Ambassador is responsible for all US activities within the country to which the United States is accredited, and interprets US policies and strategy regarding the nation. The composition of the country team varies widely depending on specific US national interests in the country, the desires of the chief of mission, the situation within the country, and the number and level of presence of US agencies. Agencies represented on the country team can include US Agency for International Devopment; Department of Defense, through the Defense Attache and Security Assistance Organization; US Information Agency, through the local US Information Service office; US Customs Service; Peace Corps representatives; US Coast Guard; US Immigration and Naturalization Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Legal Attache; et al. The country team facilitates interagency action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of US programs and policies.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

can be fine-tuned on the spot and tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules. Ambassadors must interact daily with the Department of State's strategic-level planners and decision makers. Additionally, **the Ambassador functions at both the operational and tactical levels**, where recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning are provided directly to the geographic combatant commander and commander of a joint task force. While forces in the field under a geographic combatant command are exempt from the Ambassador's statutory authority, the Ambassador's political role is important to the success of military operations involving Armed Forces.

b. **The Country Team.** The country team system **provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies**. The country team is often less than adequate for every need. In some cases it may not exist (e.g., Cuba), it may be inoperative due to damage or casualties from natural or manmade disaster, or it may simply be weak or inadequately trained in crisis management. The relationship with military chains of command is frequently ad hoc. This coordination is intended to better achieve unity of effort.

- The country team concept encourages agencies to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the Ambassador informed of their activities.

- Although the Ambassador is in charge, each agency head has direct communication with and line of authority from the parent organization. **A member of the country team who disagrees with the direction of policy may appeal** to superiors in Washington. More frequently, a member may receive home agency instructions that conflict with the consensus of the country team. **Important issues must sometimes be resolved at the national level.** The relations of country team members to their home agencies and to each other require that proceedings be consensual.

c. **US Defense Attache Office.** Service attaches comprise the USDAO. The Defense Attache (DATT) is **normally the senior Service attache assigned to the embassy**. While keeping the combatant commander informed of their activities, **DATTs are rated and funded by the Defense Intelligence Agency**. These attaches are valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. **The attaches assist the foreign internal defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander's staff** on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

d. **Security Assistance Organization. The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the Ambassador.** The SAO — which may be comprised of a military assistance advisory group or liaison group, other military activity, or a single security assistance officer — reports to the US Ambassador but is rated by the combatant commander and funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. **The SAO** assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance (SA) program. SA offices also help the US country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the US Government. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. **The SAO is excepted by law from giving direct training assistance.** Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for

specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams).

e. **United States Defense Representative (USDR).** The USDR in foreign countries is an additional duty title assigned to a military officer serving in a specifically designated position. The USDR is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to US Government officials for in-country US defense issues and activities that are not under the mission authority exercised by parent DOD components. The USDR is also the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic combatant commander and is responsible (under the direction of the chief of mission) for providing coordination of administrative and security matters to US Government officials for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned.

f. **American Embassy Public Affairs Officer and United States Information Service.** The public affairs officer is the third senior officer at the embassy. Themes, messages, and press releases prepared by the JTF are normally coordinated with the embassy public affairs officer or USIS press attache.

g. **Geographic Combatant Commands.** In order to effectively bring all elements of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, **combatant commanders are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies**.

- **Frequently, geographic combatant commands are assigned a Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) or Political Advisor (POLAD) by the Department of State.** This person provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the AOR and with the Department of State. The FPA and/or POLAD supplies information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State that are relevant to the geographic combatant commander's theater strategy.

- **Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to improve interagency coordination.** For example, representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence may be assigned to staffs of geographic combatant commands to facilitate intelligence support to military operations, to assist in the coordination of intelligence community activities within the combatant commander's AOR, to ensure that intelligence activities remain within policy and legal guidelines, and to anticipate future requirements for support.

9. Command Relationships: "Supported," "Supporting," and "Associate"

Today, the Armed Forces perform in both supported and supporting roles with other agencies. During combat operations such as DESERT STORM or in humanitarian assistance operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, the Department of Defense was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When the Department of Defense is tasked to provide military support to civil authorities, its forces perform in a supporting role. As previously discussed, commanders may support the local head of another agency, such as an Ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of other USG agencies or even private firms. **Whether supported or supporting, close coordination is the key to efficient and effective interagency operations.**

a. The NCA establish supported and/or supporting command relationships between

combatant commanders when deployment and execution orders are issued. This ensures that tasked combatant commanders receive needed support. The commanders of the geographic combatant commands, supported by the functional combatant commands such as the US Transportation Command and US Space Command, provide forces and resources to accomplish the mission. This command relationship among the combatant commanders lends itself to the interagency process. **The supported combatant commander controls and is accountable for military operations within a specified area of responsibility.** Supported commanders define the parameters, request the right capabilities, task supporting DOD components, coordinate with the appropriate Federal agencies, and develop a plan to achieve the common goal. As part of the team effort, supporting commanders provide the requested capabilities to assist the supported commander to accomplish missions requiring additional resources.

b. NGOs and PVOs do not operate within either the military or the governmental hierarchy. Therefore, **the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs is neither supported nor supporting. An associate or partnership relationship may accurately describe that which exists between military forces and engaged NGOs and PVOs.** If formed, the focal point where US military forces provide coordinated support to NGOs and PVOs would be the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).

"By melding the capabilities of the military and the NGOs and PVOs you have developed a force multiplier."

Ambassador
Madeleine K. Albright
The US Representative to the United Nations

10. The Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations' Connection to Joint Operations

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs and PVOs are frequently on scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs and PVOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

These organizations play an important role in providing support to host nations. In fact, NGOs and PVOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between $9 and $10 billion each year — more than any single nation or international body (such as the UN). **Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.** Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, **short-term objectives are frequently very similar**. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

a. **The Role of NGOs and PVOs.** NGOs and PVOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. **The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO or PVO to another.** NGOs and PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects,

relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. **The connectivity between NGOs, PVOs and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage.** But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs and PVOs are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGO and PVO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the UN and USG agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

b. **The Increasing Number of NGOs and PVOs. A JTF or multinational force may encounter scores of NGOs and PVOs in a JOA.** In Somalia alone, there were some 78 private organizations contributing relief support, and assisting the UN relief in the Rwanda crisis were over 100 relief organizations. Over 350 such agencies are registered with USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of PVOs, has a membership of over 150 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) also has membership numbering in the hundreds.

c. **Military and Private Organization Relations.** The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make **private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation**. While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by Armed Forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, **others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces,** preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed public affairs guidance. **Public affairs planning should also include the identification of points of contact with NGOs and PVOs that will operate in an affected area to arrange referrals of news media queries regarding their operations to an authorized spokesperson.** Military spokespersons should comment on NGO and PVO operations based on guidance provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]), in cooperation with the in-country headquarters of the organization.

"For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses — manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity — that only the military can deploy."

Philip Johnston
President & CEO, CARE

"We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete."

General George A. Joulwan, USA
Commander in Chief,
US European Command

d. **Military Support of NGOs and PVOs.** The NCA may determine that it is in the national interest to **task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGOs and PVOs**. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. **A climate of cooperation between NGOs, PVOs, and the military forces should be the goal.** Taskings to support NGOs and PVOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. **In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the NGOs and PVOs. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the Armed Forces should be to enable — not perform — NGO and PVO tasks.** As later described, US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

(Many agencies that commanders may encounter in an operational area are described in Appendix B of this publication, "Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations." Annex A of Appendix B contains "InterAction's Geographic Index of NGOs and PVOs.")

11. The Role of Regional and International Organizations

Regional and international organizations **possess area or global influence**. Regional examples include NATO, the Organization for African Unity, Organization of American States, Western European Union (WEU), and Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. International examples include the UN, its agencies, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. **These organizations have well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities and are usually equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency operations.** The following describes formal or informal ties between the United States and some of the largest of these regional and international organizations.

a. **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The NATO experience exemplifies the interagency process on a regional level. Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort. The durability of NATO — the world's longest lasting alliance since the Athenians League of Delos was established in 477 B.C. to repel the Persians — is testament to its success in interagency coordination.

- NATO was formed during the period immediately following World War II when the Western European nations and their North American allies became concerned with the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. Direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, and Turkey; the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia; and the illegal blockade of Berlin prompted the Alliance for the common defense of Western Europe. By 1982, sixteen nations were members of the Alliance: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain.

- At the time of NATO's establishment, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Pact) represented the US view of the proper, collective security relation between nations: an armed attack against a member was considered an armed attack

against all the members, but determination of the appropriate response was left to each country. Similarly, **the North Atlantic Treaty allowed each country to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area."** The treaty was immediately supported by movement of US military supplies and troops to Europe in 1950 under NATO's initial "Strategic Plan." Consistent with interagency practice, the plan called for each country to undertake the tasks best suited to its location or capabilities. The US role was chiefly to provide strategic bombing and naval support, with the core of ground force from European nations. Today, NATO members continue to share the burdens, risks, and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security. They uphold the individual rights of member nations and their obligations in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Nations should consider the ramifications of commitments outside of the NATO treaty but still retain the right to undertake unilateral operations.

- **NATO orientation is evolving with the changing global environment.** Dangers to peace and threats to stability in the world remain despite the end of the Cold War. With the changes wrought by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, **NATO's current "New Strategy," including combined joint task force concepts, confronts problems of burden-sharing and command in new areas and in unfamiliar roles**. This is clearly evident in NATO support to UN operations in the former Yugoslavia. A NATO maritime operation was initiated in the Adriatic in July 1992, in coordination and cooperation with operations undertaken by WEU, to monitor compliance with UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. The Alliance has been actively involved in planning, preparation, and implementation of peace operations, such as protection for humanitarian relief and support for UN monitoring of heavy weapons. The requirement for interagency coordination on an international scale has been apparent as NATO becomes increasingly involved with NGOs, PVOs, and other regional and international organizations during the course of ongoing peace operations.

Air component forces operating over the mountains of northern Italy in support of DENY FLIGHT.

- Coordination of US efforts within NATO begins with the Presidentially appointed Permanent Representative, who has the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Chief of Mission (22 USC 3901). As with any treaty, US commitment to the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the balance between the power of the President to conduct foreign policy and Congress's power of the purse. Congress has authorized and regularly funds logistic support for elements of the Armed Forces deployed to NATO outside the United States and permits cross-servicing agreements in return for reciprocal support. Beyond day-to-day operations, training exercises, and logistics authorized by statute, extraordinary employment of US military force with NATO in both warfighting and military operations other than war requires Presidential action and may be subject to congressional review, including those employments authorized and limited by the War Powers Act.

b. **The United Nations.** Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the Department of State, through the US Representative to the UN. As stated earlier, **the US Representative to the UN is a member of the NSC and participates in the formulation of policy matters relevant to the UN and its activities**. The US Representative is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by **a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Departments of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) and Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)**.

- The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

- US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter. (See Annex E, "United Nations," of Appendix C, "Regional and International Organizations," for details regarding the UN Charter and Chapter VI and VII of that charter.)

- **The UN will normally conduct peace operations or humanitarian assistance under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly.** Mandates are developed by politicians and diplomats trying to reach compromise. Because of this, military commanders have often found it difficult to translate these mandates into workable mission orders. Commanders can use the interagency process to feed back their concerns through the political apparatus of the UN. Though not always successful, clarity of mission should always be sought from the Ambassador or UN Resident Coordinator, as appropriate.

- **The UN headquarters** coordinates peace operations and humanitarian assistance around the world. **It does not, however, have a system for planning and executing these operations that is comparable to that of the United States.** The UN organizational structure consists of the headquarters and the operational field elements. Thus, there is a strategic- and tactical-level equivalent to the US Armed Forces, but no operational counterpart.

- At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans and directs missions. Either the

UNDPKO or the UNDHA serves as the headquarters component during emergencies. Additional support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service headquarters staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).

- Field-level organization is often based on the Resident Coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in conjunction with the UNDHA. The Resident Coordinator mobilizes and manages the local UN humanitarian resources and provides direction for the field relief effort.

- **In serious emergencies, the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative who reports to both the SYG directly and advises UNDPKO and UNDHA at UN headquarters.** The Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

- The CJTF deploying to a contingency site may discover the need for a direct channel to either the Resident Coordinator, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, or both. The arrangements between the JTF and UN forces should be set forth in the appropriate execute order. It is especially important that the CJTF understand the provisions of PDD-25, "Multilateral Peace Operations,"[5] the UCP, and Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."[6]

- **UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single commander.** The force commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG's Special Representative or to the SYG. **In any multinational operation, the US commander will retain command authority over all assigned US forces.** The US chain of command will flow from the NCA through the combatant commander. With NCA authorization, the multinational force commander may exercise operational control over US units in specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council.

c. **International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**. Three Red Cross organizations make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: **the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, and the individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations**. The objective of the Movement is to coordinate an entire range of humanitarian activities. For example, the



Joint forces support uncoordinated peace operations under the command authority of the US commander.

statutes of the Movement give the ICRC flexibility in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions. It is critical to point out that **these groups are distinctly different and have separate mandates and staff organizations. However, common to their history in civilian relief is their status as a neutral party.** The rules of the Geneva Convention for assistance to and protection of nonbelligerents set the base standard for interagency connectivity with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Neutrality is a vital aspect in the involvement of any Red Cross or Red Crescent organization. The protection of this neutrality is a key consideration for joint military planners and operators.

- **International Committee of the Red Cross.** Founded in 1863, **this neutral Swiss association with international influence applies the provisions of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts**. It undertakes its tasks and derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977, which the ICRC and advocates of humanitarian law argue have gained universal application through the formative custom of international law. Other nations that have signed the Protocols consider themselves bound to them. However, the United States has not ratified the 1977 Protocols and does not always recognize ICRC actions that are based on these Protocols, which presents a major problem for the legal counsel in the international arena because not all participants are similarly bound on very basic matters of international law. Adherence or nonadherence can make a mismatch of potential partners in humanitarian ventures. Various mismatches in domestic laws can also have severe impact on the ability of forces to work together. **The ICRC is distinct from the rest of the Red Cross Movement in that it has a protection mandate in addition to its relief assistance work.** It acts principally in cases of civil conflict, ensuring legal protection for the victims and acting as a neutral, independent humanitarian player in the most complex emergency situations. At times the ICRC may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, but its mandate is to function during armed conflict.

- **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** This organization consists of the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their own countries, **whose mandate is to provide humanitarian relief during disasters.** Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations may provide assistance to other federation members through their international alliance provisions.

d. **Public Affairs Planning With Regional and International Organizations.** Public affairs planning should include **the identification of points of contact and authorized spokespersons within each regional or international organization who will operate in an affected area to properly direct referrals of news media queries regarding operations**. Planning for support to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press office personnel through OASD(PA). Military spokespersons should comment on these organizations' operations based on the guidance of the OASD(PA), in cooperation with the in-country headquarters of the organizations.

(See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of these and other "Regional and International Organizations.")

1 For purposes of this publication, the term domestic refers to any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or the Republic of Palau.

2 The term CONUSA does not pertain to USPACOM AOR. However, functional responsibilities are carried out by other Army commands within the USPACOM AOR.

3 US Coast Guard personnel enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (excerpt from 14 USC 2).

4 "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander)" (excerpt from 22 USC 3827[a]).

5 PDD-25 addresses multilateral peace operations and designates lead agencies for specific functions. It divides responsibilities for peace operations between the Department of State and the Department of Defense: Department of State to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no US combat units participating (e.g., Golan Heights, El Salvador, and Cambodia); and Department of Defense for peacekeeping missions in which US combat units are participating (e.g., Macedonia). Presidential Decision Directive 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," (The White House, May 1994), p. 12.

6 "For US forces participating in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices, the President retains and will never relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate US forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council." Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

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CHAPTER III
ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

"In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGO community in-theater literally 'met on the dance floor.' Given that a JTF commander's concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support . . ."

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder,
USA Commander,
JTF SUPPORT HOPE

(Throughout this chapter, various organizational planning and operations tools are referred to that are not currently formalized in staffing or authorization. Because of this, and because titles and specific responsibilities may vary by Service — or even by type of operation — these referrals represent recommendations only. In reviewing these tools, the functions they perform and not the titles assigned are the most important consideration.)

1. Organizing for Success

When either deliberate or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized within an interagency context will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort. **To the extent feasible, joint planning should include all the participants from the outset.** Appropriate decision-making structures should be established at headquarters and field levels in order to resolve political, humanitarian, and military issues and to coordinate operations. **Establishment of coordination or liaison cells at each level will facilitate communication between participants.** Previous chapters described interagency relationships, roles of the many members of the interagency arena, and the conditions under which the Department of Defense interacts with other agencies, departments, and organizations. This chapter will integrate these factors and suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interagency coordination — whether in domestic or foreign operations — and focus on the operational level and below.

2. Organizing for Success at the Operational Level

Interagency forums established early at the operational level will enable close and constructive dialogue between the engaged agencies. In concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, combatant commands should support effective interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives through the following:

a. **Identify all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation**. This analysis

needs to include identification of the participating NGOs and PVOs. In many cases, initial planning and coordination have occurred in Washington, D.C., so the Joint Staff should ensure that the combatant commander and the combatant command staff are made aware of all the agencies to be involved in the mission.

b. **Establish an authoritative interagency hierarchy, considering the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility.** As previously identified, there may be missions in which the Armed Forces of the United States are in a supporting role. There may be resistance to the establishment of such an interagency hierarchy, as interagency players may view themselves as "one among equals" at all levels. **Nonetheless, commanders should attempt to insert discipline, responsibility, and rigor into the process in order to function effectively.** In many cases, the military commander will discover that resistance and disagreement are based upon a lack of information or difference of perception, which can be corrected by ensuring constant communication between and with all concerned parties. Regardless of the commander's efforts to foster coordination and cooperation, critical issues may arise that need to be forwarded up through the chain of command for proper resolution.

c. **Define the objectives of the response effort.** (These should be broadly outlined in tasking orders by the CJCS/JFC commander's intent.)

d. **Define courses of action for both theater military operations and agency activities while striving for operational compatibility.**

e. **Solicit from each agency, department or organization a clear definition of the role that each plays in the overall operation.** The understanding of operating principles, legal shortage of capabilities, points of contact, crisis management organization, Presidential direction (if applicable), and issues or tasks that cannot be undertaken may well affect mission success. In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the combatant command's staff. In such cases, it is advisable for the combatant commander to request temporary assignment of liaison officers from the participating agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ.

f. **Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.** Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. History demonstrates that obstacles are frequently identified too late in the process and become nearly insurmountable for the commander. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. **Once identified, if the obstacles cannot be resolved at the JFC's level they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for immediate resolution.**

g. **Identify the resources required for the mission and determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources, reducing duplication and increasing coherence in the collective effort.** This identification is a critical area in which the commander and military planner can bring to bear detailed planning expertise in advising the interagency forum of both resource requirements and providers.

h. **Define the desired end state and exit criteria** (e.g., transition from military to civilian control, war to military operations other than war).

i. **Maximize the mission's assets to support the longer-term goals of the enterprise.** The military's contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the international response to a crisis.

j. **Establish interagency assessment teams** that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation.

k. **Implement crisis action planning.** Crisis action planning by the combatant command staff for operations in which both military and civilian efforts are involved **will normally consider the following:**

- Government officials and agencies of the nation or state.
- The Department of State and embassies when a foreign nation is involved.
- Officials of USG agencies associated with the US response.
- Makeup and organization of the combatant command, the joint task force, supporting combatant commands, and Service and functional component commands, as well as supporting Defense agencies.
- Multinational military forces and UN agencies, and other regional and international organizations when they are involved.
- Host-nation or local support available.
- NGOs and PVOs.
- Civil contract support.

3. Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Domestic Operations

As discussed in Chapter II, "Established Interagency Relationships," while the Secretary of Defense reserves authority to employ combatant command resources, **the Secretary of the Army is the DOD Executive Agent for the execution and management of military support to civil authorities in domestic operations** (other than DOD responses to acts of terrorism). The Secretary of the Army exercises his responsibilities through the Director of Military Support. (See Figure III-1.) The Secretary of Defense personally oversees and manages DOD response to acts of terrorism.

a. **The responsibility for determining the command and control relationship between the DCO, FCO, and the CJTF rests with the supported combatant commander.** (See Figure III-1.) Normally, the DCO and CJTF are different individuals because of their dissimilar responsibilities and assets. Separating the two distinct functions affords the commander flexibility to operate freely throughout the disaster area, while the DCO focuses on coordinating DOD response activities and validating tasks in the disaster field office.

b. **Organizational tools** that may assist interagency support of civil authorities **include the following:**

- **Interagency Planning Cell (IPC).** The IPC is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. **The IPC is established to rapidly advise the supported combatant commander about the resources of other agencies**



Figure III-1. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Domestic Operations

in the relief effort. An IPC will enable a coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject-matter experts. Moreover, the burden of coordination at the JTF level could also be lightened. Public affairs coordination with other Federal agencies will normally be conducted by the OASD(PA). Consideration should also be given to establishment of IPCs on the staffs of supporting combatant commanders, such as the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

- **Liaison Section.** Upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order, or at the direction of the combatant commander, **the liaison section within the combatant command staff is activated. Moreover, liaisons should be assigned to the USG lead agency**, such as FEMA, to act as spokespersons for the combatant commander at the USG agency headquarters and field teams, to clarify operational concepts and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. **Exchange of liaisons among key agencies significantly enhances unity of effort.** For example, the intrinsic capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles will not be readily apparent to other agencies but are important in describing the military contribution to the Federal response. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the military force can assist the force commander to maximize agency core competencies and concentrate the resources of engaged agencies. Service engineer units have significant capabilities. Military aircraft can perform essential reconnaissance search and rescue and airlift. Navy surface combatants and auxiliaries possess important medical and industrial capabilities. Coast Guard air and surface units possess search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and environmental protection capabilities. Nuclear submarines have powered public electrical utilities following disasters, and naval vessels have provided temporary billeting and feeding for migrants. These are examples of operations that are best described by a liaison attached to the lead agency by the combatant commander. **Key capabilities that the liaison section in domestic operations should have include the following:**

  - Interoperable communications with both the combatant command and JTF staffs.
  - Language or translation capability when working in a multilingual area.
  - Physical security.
  - Logistic support (including food, water, transportation, and other types of support) coordinated by the Joint Staff J-4 Logistics Readiness Center.
  - Security of classified material.

In short, the commander should plan to provide the liaison section, as well as liaisons contributed to the command, with all necessary capabilities unless explicit agreement is arrived at prior to the operation.

- **Interagency Information Bureau (IIB). Establish an IIB at each echelon of command to provide information to the public.** Emphasis should be placed on describing and promoting the Federal effort at the same time that friction is internalized for resolution.

(In addition to tools described above, most of the mechanisms described below may also be applied to domestic interagency support.)

4. Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Foreign Operations

The geographic combatant commander and combatant command staff should be continuously engaged in interagency coordination and establishing working relationships with interagency players long before crisis action planning is required. In many cases, the combatant commander's organization for crisis is well established and functioning far in advance of such an occurrence, with preexisting and long-standing relationships formed among engaged agencies, departments, and organizations at the national and theater levels. However, **when crisis action planning becomes necessary, the geographic combatant commander (or POLAD) communicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s) as part of crisis assessment**. The Ambassador and country team are often aware of factors and considerations that the geographic combatant commander might apply to develop courses of action, and they are key to bringing together US national resources within the host country. (See Figure III-2.)

The geographic combatant commander, having communicated with the Ambassador, ensures that appropriate crisis responses are made at the operational level.

a. **Crisis Action Organization.** The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. Activation of other temporary crisis action cells to administer the unique requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities. **Because there are very few operational-level counterparts to the combatant commander within other agencies, establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination is appropriate and is a necessary precondition to effective coordinated operations.** When designating a JTF, the combatant commander will select a CJTF; assign a JOA; specify a mission; provide planning guidance; and, in coordination with the CJTF, either allocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command or request forces from supporting combatant commands. In contrast to an established combatant commander and CJTF command



Figure III-2. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Foreign Operations

structure, NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities. Further, many of these organizations may be present in the operational area at the invitation and funding of the host country. As such, they may be structured to follow the conformity of host-nation regulations or restrictions which may hinder military operations. Thus, **the staff of the combatant command should anticipate organizational and operational mismatches, primarily by designating points in the organization at which liaisons and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate. These may include the following:**

- **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** In a humanitarian assistance (HA) operation, the combatant command's crisis action organization may organize as a HACC. **The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international and regional organizations that may participate in a HA operation at the strategic level.** Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command's staff and crisis action organization. If a combatant commander chooses to organize a HACC, liaisons from other USG agencies (e.g., USAID/OFDA and US Public Health Service), US Army

CORDS — THE VIETNAM INTERAGENCY EXPERIENCE

The Vietnam conflict was often fraught with inefficiency among the myriad USG agencies. Each of these agencies operated independently, without much interagency coordination, and each was satisfied that its individual interests were being met. The consequence was a seemingly incoherent war effort. In March 1966, after it became clear that this would not work, President Johnson appointed a Special Assistant who spoke with the authority of the President to supervise Washington interagency efforts and to stimulate greater unity of effort.

Next, President Johnson decided to establish a single authority in Vietnam. Two previous organizations were combined — the USG agencies' Office of Civilian Operations and Military Assistance Command Vietnam's (MACV's) Revolutionary Development Support — under the authority of a single civilian manager, designated as Deputy to the Commanding General, MACV. The unified civil-military program was designated Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Support, or "CORDS." Later, the term "revolutionary" was replaced by "rural."

The next step was to integrate the rural programs of civilian agencies and the military at province level under a single Province Senior Advisor. Heading each province team were top-quality US military or civilian leaders.

The integrated nature of the advisory team was evident in its composition. Below the Senior Advisor level, representatives of the US and Vietnamese military and US civilian agencies filled billets according to core competencies. For example, US Army officers performed intelligence, security, PSYOP, and

civil affairs functions with the assistance of CIA representatives. Other key programs were directed and administered by both civilian and military officials in the CORDS organization. The CORDS program brought unity to what had been a disparate effort.

The key to the success of CORDS was decisiveness and top-level support, beginning with the President. While individual agencies had argued for the status quo, integrated actions were necessary. Strong leadership and recognition of the need for interagency coordination brought the concept to fruition, and CORDS stands forth as one of the most positive lessons of the Vietnam experience.

In a broad context, CORDS provides an excellent example of an effective campaign plan within an interagency context. The operational planner countering or supporting an insurgent campaign must avoid thinking in terms of the customary time-space-mass continuum of the conventional theater or battlefield. In the classic Maoist three-phase theory of guerrilla warfare (strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offense), military power does not become truly important until the third and final phase. The insurgents' key tools during the early and mid-stages are informational, political and economic. The architects of the CORDS program largely recognized how the North Vietnamese strategy, called Dau Tranh, wielded these elements of power. By integrating the efforts of various US and South Vietnamese agencies, they "attacked" Dau Tranh along all four elements of North Vietnam's national power. In essence, CORDS was the campaign designed to achieve the strategic objective of defeating the Viet Cong insurgency. Unfortunately, it was simply implemented too late.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

Corps of Engineers representatives, key NGOs and PVOs, international and regional organizations, and host country agencies may also be members of the HACC in large scale HA operations.

- **Logistics Operations Center (LOC).** A LOC functions as **the single point of contact for coordinating the flow and distribution of supplies into the operating area**, relieving the JTF of as much of this burden as possible. Other actions that the LOC may perform include the following:

  •• Obtaining authority (from and/or through CINC, J-4, and/or J-5) to negotiate for host-nation support (HNS) and on-site procurement through the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State.

  •• Determining a lead agency (UN, Service, or other agency) for contracting and support negotiation.

  •• Serving, in concert with the LRC, as a logistics link to the Joint Staff, the Services, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), USCINCTRANS, HNS, and other supporting commands and agencies during JTF operations.

- **Liaison Section.** As in domestic operations, the **liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to interagency coordination**. Upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order, or at the direction of the combatant commander, the liaison section is activated. A liaison section assists the combatant commander by providing a single forum for the coordination of military activities among

multinational forces and engaged NGOs and PVOs, the local government and indigenous population, and regional and international organizations. As in domestic operations, military forces, engaged agencies, and in this case the host nation should consider assigning liaisons to the combatant command staff in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Key capabilities required for the liaison section, described above in paragraph 3, "Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Domestic Operations," are also necessary during foreign operations.

b. **NGO and PVO Relationships. Courses of action** developed by the combatant command staff **should consider and incorporate interagency relationships that the JTF has with other USG agencies, the UN (if engaged), regional and international organizations, and NGOs and PVOs**. These considerations should be forwarded to the Joint Staff for negotiation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense with counterparts at the headquarters level of agencies and organizations. Working through the Joint Staff, geographic combatant commanders may arrange meetings before deployment with US Government agencies, UN, NATO (or appropriate regional organization), and NGO and PVO agency heads in Washington, D.C., or New York to coordinate activities, identify requirements and capabilities, and establish interagency relationships for the operation. These meetings can be set up through the Joint Staff, UN, or private agency consortiums such as InterAction. It would be useful to have these relationships included in the execute order to clarify this information for involved military forces. Commanders should ask for authority to accomplish these tasks if it is not specified in tasking orders from CJCS or JFC. Because authoritative coordination can be realized at an agency's strategic level instead of hoping to attain similar results with tactical-level agency representatives in country, these meetings can be extremely productive. This coordination is another tool used to maximize unity of effort.

c. **Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).** Early on, **an assessment must be made of what resources are required immediately to stabilize the humanitarian crisis** (e.g., "stop the dying"), **the capability of the organizations already operating in the crisis area to meet those needs, and the shortfall that the military force must provide** until the humanitarian relief organizations can marshal their resources. Without an early assessment modified periodically as the operation progresses, requests for military assistance cannot be adequately evaluated, actual progress is difficult to measure, and meaningful disengagement criteria probably cannot be established. A HAST can accomplish all of these functions.

- Prior to the deployment of the main body, the geographic combatant commander may organize and deploy a HAST to implement the following:

  - Facilitate multiagency inclusion in humanitarian operations.

  - Acquire necessary information about the operational area.

  - Plan for the operation.

  - Assess existing conditions, available infrastructure, and the capabilities and size of the force required for the mission.

- To expedite assessments prior to deployment, the HAST **should establish contact with the US Embassy in the affected country** to help gain access to the appropriate host-nation officials and other USG agency representatives. It is

important to stress that the country team possesses a wealth of information about the host nation and can greatly facilitate the mission of the HAST. The HAST should include representatives from the combatant command intelligence officer (J-2), J-3, J-4 (especially transportation and engineer infrastructure planners and contracting and medical personnel), J-5, J-6, legal section, chaplain section, and civil affairs section. Based on prior coordination and established associate or partnership working relationships, the HAST may also include key agency NGO and PVO representatives. On arrival in the country, the HAST should complete the following:

•• Establish liaison and coordinate assessment efforts with the US Embassy, host-nation and regional agencies, UN organizations (such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]), supported commanders or their representatives, and other national teams and relief agencies.

•• Define coordinating relationships and lines of authority among military, embassy, and USAID personnel with others providing humanitarian assistance and with officials of the nation being assisted. This is an important preliminary step needed to identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort associated with delivery of food and medical supplies and for interfaces for coordination with NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations.

•• **Initiate liaison with the USAID/ OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)** (which provides rapid response field presence to international disasters with specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills in order to assist US country teams and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters) and UNDHA and UNDP, if deployed. The DART and UN are equipped to calculate the food, water, shelter, and health services required to implement the humanitarian relief effort as well as the sources of these requirements. Integration of these calculations into the HAST assessment would reduce the potential for duplication of effort and enhance calculations of logistics required to support the collective effort. In concert with the country team, the DART can determine the full range of services necessary in cases of natural disaster. Figure III-3 depicts the organization of the DART.

5. Interagency Information Management

NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations on scene possess considerable information that may be essential to the success of the military operation. Relief workers have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the population. Working closely with indigenous peoples, they understand local culture and practices. As a consequence, the relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

a. Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand.

b. Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces to the populace.

c. Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders.

d. Security situation.

e. Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.



Figure III-3. United States Agency for International Development/Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team

THE INTERAGENCY BATTLEFIELD

The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.

SOURCE: Observations from August 1994 Joint Readiness Training Center rotation of 25th Infantry Division (Light) in which a variety of agencies participated. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, The Challenges of Peace, (Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn edition, 1994)

This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. However, **the manner in which information is treated by military forces and the humanitarian assistance community can be sensitive**. Handled properly, NGOs and PVOs will be active participants in the interagency team seeking to resolve the crisis. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

6. Interagency Training and Readiness

Rehearsal and synchronization exercises between the combatant commands, JTF, other elements of the Department of Defense, and separate agencies provide an essential forum for key events and policy issues to be coordinated and resolved. As such, **combatant commanders should schedule and participate in interagency coordination training with other departments and agencies of the US Government, international organizations, and the humanitarian assistance community**.

a. **Training should focus on identifying and assessing agency capabilities and core competencies, identifying procedural disconnects and attaining unity of effort.** To sustain the readiness of the command to rapidly respond to crises coherently, the training audience should include members of the HACC, LOC and liaison section described above, contingency JTF commands, and other agency representatives. Combatant command and JTF exercises should include nonmilitary representatives "playing" their normal roles, even in hypothetical combat situations. Training with NGOs and PVOs, the UN, and other USG agencies before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability through solidifying the relationship between civilian organizations and the military. **Each organization should understand how to work with the other.** As discussed, the military and nonmilitary agencies, departments, and organizations have totally different cultures, but by simultaneously teaching about and training for one another's organizations, interoperability can be significantly improved.

b. Increasingly, interagency coordination training is occurring at combatant commands, senior-level colleges (such as the National Defense University), the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute, and on the mock battlefields of the Joint Readiness Training Center.

(See Appendix D of this publication, "Agency Capabilities and Resources — Quick Look," for a depiction of many of the various agencies discussed in this publication. It should be reviewed by the combatant command staff as a preliminary planning tool for potential interagency relationships and core competencies.)

7. Joint Task Force Mission Analysis

a. **Assessment Team.** A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. **The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.** If so, staffing requirements will be reduced. Recommended team members include CJTF, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, key logistic staff personnel (including transportation and engineer planners and contracting personnel), medical personnel, legal officer, chaplain, civil affairs officer, a member of the USAID/OFDA DART scheduled to work with the JTF if involved in foreign operations, and other staff members necessary to

Clear goals and the personnel required to complete them are vital to progress and good host-nation relations.

commence the interagency planning process. For foreign operations, **special operations force personnel who possess unique cultural, language, and technical skills should be requested through the combatant commander**. The assessment team may help clarify the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of force is required to accomplish it, the proper sequence for deployment of the force, availability of state and local or in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by organizations other than military forces.

b. **Coordinated Operations. Other types of operations** (e.g., development or humanitarian relief operations) **may be in progress prior to arrival of the JTF in the projected joint operations area**. The desired end state, essential tasks, and exit criteria must be clearly expressed to the media in order to gain and maintain public support. As discussed, NGOs, PVOs, and other regional and international organizations are often conducting operations well before the arrival of military forces and will be there long after the US military departs. What is done by the military in the meantime has a distinct influence on long-term goals and the ability to achieve them. **It is important to coordinate these operations and activities with the total plan. The ranking US military commander may be the only official in the crisis area whose goals and responsibilities include unifying the efforts of all agencies.** In humanitarian assistance operations, a JTF's mission cannot successfully conclude until in-place organizations are operating effectively. Therefore, successful interaction between organizations is imperative.

c. **Priority Task. Identify the single most important task that will stabilize the situation** (e.g., establish secure convoy routes). Communicate this to the combatant commander as well as the Ambassador. To reach this bottom line determination, seek not only military staff input but also that of key agency representatives.

d. **Regional Strategy.** In further analyzing the mission, **consider the regional strategy for the projected joint operations area**. The Department of State, UN, and other regional and international organizations can provide this information with an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in

projected operations. This information helps legitimize the mission and assists in emphasizing end state and force requirements.

e. **Political Considerations.** When the JTF is deployed, **the CJTF should quickly establish a relationship with the US Ambassador, the country team, and either the US agency representatives in country for foreign operations or the FCO for domestic disaster relief operations.** If not initiated at the national level in advance, these relationships should be negotiated with the US embassy upon arrival. If time and the situation permit, it is important that the CJTF and key staff members meet with the NSC IWG in Washington, D.C., prior to deployment. During this visit it may also be useful to meet with the regional and functional elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff representatives, the appropriate regional bureau at the Department of State, and embassies of the nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship with the Ambassador will help in any foreign interagency endeavor. In cases of cross-border operations in which more than one country is involved, each US mission may have a different perspective of the operation. Intelligence and information relationships between the CJTF, local and state authorities, the country team, and USG agency representatives must be established at the earliest stages of planning. **Commanders should recognize local and organizational sensitivities to counterintelligence units and their operations.** The CJTF should consult with appropriate Ambassadors and country teams to coordinate actions and determine areas of concern, ensuring that the combatant commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are informed of all consultations in order that the Joint Staff can properly coordinate with the Department of State.

f. **JTF Headquarters.** The location of the JTF headquarters, whether afloat or ashore, is very important. **Not only should it be defensible, it should be positioned to work easily with the political and private sector, the media, and other military elements of an operation. It needs a sufficient power supply and communication lines to support operations and should provide a location for a possible Special Compartmented Information Facility and a collateral storage of intelligence information.** Coordination at all levels is a requirement. Proximity to the American Embassy or US Diplomatic Mission may provide the potential to enhance military operational capability.

8. Organizational Tools for the JTF

Commanders should establish control structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the area. As well as military operations, this structure should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian activities as well as media relations groups that may be involved. Commanders should ultimately consider how their actions and those of engaged organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. Most useful in the interagency process are platforms providing an opportunity for all sides to be heard.

a. **Executive Steering Group (ESG). The ESG may be composed of the principals from the JTF, the embassy, NGO and PVO communities present in the JOA, and other organizations as appropriate.** Lacking another similar forum, the ESG can provide high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies as well as for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. **The ESG plays a policy role and is charged with interpreting and coordinating theater aspects of strategic**

policy. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies. The ESG may be charged with formulating, coordinating, and promulgating local and theater policies required for the explanation, clarification, and implementation of policies developed by the IWG. The ESG should either be cochaired by the CJTF and Ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission.

b. **Civil-Military Operations Center.** The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, NGOs and PVOs, and the population. Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements. (See Figure III-4.) **Although not a new concept, the CMOC has been effectively employed as a means to coordinate civil and military operations and plays an execution role (vice the policy role of the ESG).** The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent—flexible in size and composition. During large scale HA operations, if a HOC is formed by the host country or UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the host nation. In fact, **more than one CMOC may be established in an AOR or JOA** (such as occurred in Rwanda), **and each is task-organized based on the mission**. The transition from conflict to postconflict or during humanitarian assistance operations requires the supported commander to shift support priorities toward accomplishment of the civil-military operations (CMO) mission. Dedicating combat support and combat service support assets for CMO employment is one method by which the commander can accomplish the mission and meet the needs of the local population. During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC responsibilities to the UN.

"The center (CMOC in Somalia) was an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational coordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions. By developing good personal relationships the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief communities."

Ambassador Robert Oakley

- The CJTF may form a CMOC as the action team to provide the following:

  •• Carry out guidance and institute CJTF decisions regarding civil-military operations.

  •• Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

  •• Provide a partnership forum for military and other engaged organizations.

  •• Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from the NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations.

- **It can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission.** In establishing the CMOC, the CJTF should build it from a nucleus of organic operations, intelligence,



Figure III-4. Role of the Civil-Military Operations Center

civil affairs, logistics, and communication elements. (See Figure III-5.) The CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies that include the following:

•• Liaisons from Service and functional components, and supporting infrastructure, such as ports and airfields.

•• USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance Relief Team representatives.

•• DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.

•• Military liaison personnel from participating countries.



Figure III-5. Model Civil-Military Operations Center

•• Host country or local government agency representatives.

•• Representatives of regional and international organizations (e.g., UNHCR and ICRC).

•• Representatives from NGOs and PVOs.

- Political representatives may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs and PVOs because it avoids guesswork by providing positive direction for their efforts when and where most needed. Although US forces may be latecomers compared to many relief and international organizations, they bring considerable resources with them. It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution. The CJTF cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies, but JTF resources and capabilities such as protection, logistic support, information, communication, and other services are frequently sought by these agencies. The assistance provided often leads to their cooperation.

- **A CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify components within the interagency forum capable of fulfilling needs.** Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action.

- **CMOC tasks may include the following:**

•• Facilitate and coordinate activities of the JTF, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.

•• Receive, validate, coordinate, and monitor requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.

•• Coordinate response to requests for military support with Service components.

•• Coordinate requests to NGOs and PVOs for their support.

CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC. The CMOC was co-located with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

SOURCE: Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center For Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

•• Coordinate with the DART deployed to the scene by USAID/OFDA.

•• Convene ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support NGO and PVO requirements (examples include convoy escort and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers).

•• Convene follow-on assessment groups.

•• Coordinate public affairs matters.

•• Provide situation reports regarding JTF operations, security, and other information for participants in the collective effort.

•• Chair port and airfield committee meetings for space and access-related issues.

•• Facilitate creation and organization of a logistics distribution system for food, water, and medical relief efforts.

•• Support, as required, civic action teams.

- The JTF PAO should attend daily CMOC meetings. **As an active member of the CMOC, the PAO is responsible for ensuring that member agencies agree on message and press releases and for developing a group consensus in response to media queries.** Although each agency's message need not be identical, it is imperative that agencies not contradict one another.

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOC — to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center."

Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni, USMC

c. **Liaison Teams.** Commanders designate **liaison officers (LNOs) as the focal point for communication with external agencies and the host-nation government**. LNOs centralize direction and staff cognizance over planning, coordination, and operations with external agencies or forces. Supported agencies, departments, and organizations need a much clearer understanding of the military planning process. This is best accomplished by direct liaison. LNOs normally are assigned to the

office of the JTF's chief of staff and work closely with the operations officer to seek and resolve interagency problems. **Their key role is to foster better understanding between participating forces, agencies, and the local government.** The purpose of the liaison teams is to establish authoritative representation of the CJTF that can accurately interpret the CJTF's intentions and explain the capabilities of the JTF. Conversely, the liaison team interprets for the JTF operations officer the intentions and capabilities of the nonmilitary organizations. Liaison teams provide input during development of courses of action for future operations and work to maximize current operations through proactive interaction with the agencies, departments, and organizations to which they are attached. Experience indicates that transportation, language qualification, communications, and a single point of contact in the JTF headquarters are essential elements to successful liaison. In support of humanitarian assistance missions, functional skills and experience of liaisons should align with the need for medical and logistics expertise. **Exchanging liaison teams and officers has contributed greatly to coordination in multinational military operations.** The same principle applies to coordination of interagency operations.

- **Especially consider a liaison status between the JTF staff and the DART in MOOTW.** The DART is uniquely qualified to address both sides of the civil-military relationship.[1] The DART understands the NGO and PVO culture and language, as well as military involvement in humanitarian assistance. A JTF-DART liaison relationship should be sought during coordination between the geographic combatant command staff and the Joint Staff.

- It is extremely important that LNOs are language-qualified, are regionally oriented, and have a solid knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, and culture of their organizations. Civil affairs or coalition support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment LNO teams may be another option, although in some cases their loyalties may affect reliability.

- Liaison teams are formed when a 24-hour representational capability is required. Teams are tailored to the specific situation and may require CJCS-controlled communications assets in some circumstances.

- Individual liaison officers are assigned when 24-hour representation is not required and adequate communications with the JTF staff are available.

9. Other JTF Interagency Considerations

a. Intelligence Support and Control

- The combatant command's staff should **coordinate for the deployment of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) to help ensure JTF connectivity with the theater joint intelligence center (JIC) and national intelligence agencies**. The interagency support provided by a NIST allows access to agency-unique information and analysis. It affords a link to national-level data bases and information that can provide information beyond the organic resources of the JTF. NIST members are available to the JTF and combatant command headquarters prior to deployment for team building activities and predeployment briefings. Participating agencies retain control of their members deployed with the NIST, but the NIST operates under the staff supervision of the JTF J-2.

- **The JIC is the primary intelligence organization providing support to**

joint operations in theater. It is responsible for producing and providing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces, and elements and also coordinates support from other intelligence organizations.

- **The joint intelligence support element (JISE) is the CJTF's primary intelligence apparatus.** It is established along with the JTF itself. The JISE may constitute a new entity, or it may be little more than the combatant command's JIC, or elements thereof, moving forward.

- Essential elements of information and intelligence must also be shared between and among all command elements supporting the JTF and combatant command (to include USTRANSCOM elements providing strategic lift).

- JTF intelligence operations require redundant communications capabilities to properly support various complex requirements. Joint intelligence planners for JTF operations will normally prepare a detailed intelligence architecture that will support all components during the course of each unique operation. Standard JTF intelligence operations require Joint Worldwide Integrated Communications Systems (JWICS) capability in order to provide the joint task force commander secure video teleconferencing and data capability. JWICS also provides a secure data path for the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). The JDISS system provides secure intelligence data processing and image processing. Each Service will also use its own joint-compatible Service-unique intelligence systems to support its specific requirements.

- The JTF and combatant command staffs should make every attempt to exploit open source information in preparing and executing interagency operations.

- **The JISE will face unique challenges in providing adequate and appropriate support to the CJTF.** Traditional sources of classified military information will have to be melded with unclassified information from open sources and local human intelligence (HUMINT). This effort will be complicated by sensitivities of nonmilitary partners in interagency activities to the concept of military intelligence.

- **Consideration must be given to control of sensitive or classified military information in forums such as the CMOC** that include representatives of other USG agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations. Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information practiced by the Department of Defense normally do not exist within other agencies. This omission may result in the inadvertent or intentional passage of sensitive information to individuals not cleared for access to such information.

- The combatant commander has the authority and responsibility to control the disclosure and release of classified military information within the JOA in accordance with MCM 176-92, "Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Unified Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations." **In the absence of sufficient guidance, command J-2s should share only information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable.** When required, authority to downgrade classification or to sanitize information should be provided to the appropriate operational echelon. Any US

classified information released to a non-US force or organization must be properly marked to indicate that it is releasable.

- Most organizations cannot afford more than a minimal level of security protection to classified information given them by the United States. Therefore, it is likely that the information they are provided will be disclosed to unauthorized individuals.

- Joint task force operations may require significant force protection support based on the uniqueness of the operational area into which the forces deploy. An operational force protection package may need to be deployed in advance echelon forces to quickly develop the on-the-ground situation for the JTF commander. Force protection teams can consist of counterintelligence personnel, interrogators, interpreters, and other specially trained personnel as required. Force protection teams normally will have mobile communications and may use the Theater Rapid Reaction Intelligence Package system to communicate critical data to the JTF.

b. **Logistic Support. Logistic requirements and resource availability coordination is vital to sustain the operation.** The level of the logistic effort conducted by local government or civilian agencies will have a bearing on deployment and sustainment of the JTF. Moreover, the JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics after arrival.

- The supported combatant commander's LRC provides the JTF with the link to the Joint Staff, the Services, DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other supporting commands and agencies. It is imperative that supporting and/or supported relationships are officially established as early as possible (for planning purposes) by use of CJCS tasking orders (planning, warning, alert, and execute orders).

- **Contracting with US or local civilian agencies to augment military support capabilities with local supplies, services, and real estate requirements becomes a consideration for the JTF.** Another contracting avenue is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). It provides civilian contractual assistance in peace to meet crisis or wartime support requirements worldwide. LOGCAP can provide a myriad of specialty contract services such as well drilling, laundry, power generation, portable toilets, cranes, plumbing, construction, lighting, and port support.

- **The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG agencies, the country team, coalition or UN forces, NGOs, and PVOs.** The Joint Movement Center is the primary organization for coordinating movements to support joint operations in theater. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

- Coordination is essential to full utilization of NGO and PVO resources, which defrays military support for humanitarian operations. In addition, it will help avoid saturation of one sector at the expense of another and will strengthen unity of effort.

c. **Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Support.** Environmental and geophysical conditions cause natural disasters (typhoons, hurricanes, floods, droughts,

earthquakes, tidal waves) or adversely affect the joint agency response to these disasters and to other operations. The JTF commander must have access to accurate advance knowledge of METOC conditions to successfully conduct military operations.

- The combatant command senior METOC officer should coordinate for deployment of METOC support to provide accurate weather and oceanographic data to support the operation. Component commands provide the METOC personnel and resources.

- The Joint METOC Forecast Unit (JMFU) is the primary organization providing forecasting support to joint operations in theater. The JMFU is assisted by Service METOC centers. The JMFU is responsible for producing and providing the METOC information required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces, and elements and coordinates support from other METOC organizations.

- The JMFU and component METOC personnel perform observing and forecasting services, maintaining a constant vigil for the impacts of adverse weather and oceanographic conditions on operations.

- The JMFU and component METOC personnel have access to weather satellite imagery and data, accurate forecast models of atmospheric and oceanographic conditions, and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) capabilities and can exploit international weather and oceanographic data bases.

d. **Legal Support.** Legal advisors should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to military forces and other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, domestic and international. The legal advisors must be active participants in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand knowledge necessary to identify and resolve legal issues confronting the commander.

- Legal advisors can help resolve some of the toughest interagency issues involving the following:

  •• Domestic legal authority for DOD participation and support.

  •• International law.

  •• Dislocated civilians.

  •• Immunity and asylum.

  •• Claims.

  •• Investigations.

  •• War crimes and related issues.

  •• Arrests and detentions.

  •• Intelligence law.

  •• Budget and fiscal matters.

  •• Contracting.

  •• Environmental restrictions.

  •• Limitations on employment of US military forces.

- **Rules of engagement (ROE) and requests for changes to ROE can quickly escalate to the Presidential level.** Maximum coordination and understanding in country among USG agencies is crucial to a well-informed and timely decision at the national level. In multinational operations, for such purposes as peacekeeping operations or humanitarian

assistance missions, a preplanned set of ROE becomes critical. The CJCS standing ROE (CJCS Instruction 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces," 1 October 1994) serves as a coordination tool with US allies for the development of multinational ROE. ROE and revisions to ROE must be communicated to NGOs, PVOs, and international and regional organizations when these rules affect their operations.

e. **Media Affairs.** In building an atmosphere of trust and cooperation with the media, **the United States must speak with one voice — both politically and militarily — and at the same time, see that partners' voices are heard**. Media considerations for the CJTF should include the following:

- Establish a Joint Information Bureau (JIB).
- Include a public affairs representative during all stages of the planning process for the operation.
- Coordinate with combatant commander, the Department of Defense, the Ambassador, and the country team in JTF interaction with the media.
- Coordinate with the embassy through its PAO and civil information officer, if present, and host-nation Ministry of Information.
- Provide representatives of the NGOs and PVOs access to the media through the JIB's facilities.
- Allow a representative from the JIB to be present at command meetings and briefings and to attend the CMOC or similar civil-military organization meeting.
- Assemble the JTF public affairs section, to include a dedicated JIB representative from engaged agencies, if possible.
- Invite assignment of a spokesperson from the humanitarian relief community to assist in media briefings when the JIB is created.
- Establish a civil information program, coordinated between a civil affairs command, the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF), the USIS officer, the host country, and other appropriate agencies.

f. **Space Support. Support from space will be essential during joint operations and unified actions**, especially when infrastructure in the JOA is damaged or nonexistent. Space systems can provide reliable communications, weather data, terrain information, mapping support, and precise navigation data. Such support comes from a variety of sources and must be coordinated between agencies for effective application. The CJTF should consider establishing a space operations cell consisting of members from US Space Command's Joint Space Support Team, the NIST, the Defense Mapping Agency, and the Defense Information Support Agency. This will assure the CJTF direct access to the major resources necessary to provide multi-agency space support.

10. Humanitarian Operations Center

During large scale HA operations, a HOC may be created through coordination with other participants. The host nation should provide the primary staff and direction for the HOC when the operation is conducted within a sovereign nation. If that sovereign nation is unable to do so or is nonexistent, the UN (if engaged) should be considered to direct the HOC. **The members of the HOC coordinate the overall relief strategy; identify logistic requirements for NGOs, PVOs, and international and regional organizations; and identify and prioritize**

HA needs and requests for military support. The HOC does not exercise command and control. Rather, its purpose is to achieve unity of effort through coordination and effective concentration of resources, implemented by the individual organizations in accordance with their own operational practices. It limits or eliminates interference in executing the mission and avoids working at cross-purposes.

a. Membership of the HOC, normally under the direction of the host country or UN, should include representatives of participating organizations who can speak authoritatively about their own policies, objectives, and practices and who, ideally, can commit their agencies, departments, and organizations to courses of action and expenditure of resources. If the HA operation is a US unilateral effort, a USAID/OFDA representative will most likely serve as the director of the HOC. Other representatives should come from the NGO and PVO community, international and regional organizations, and the government of the affected nation, if appropriate.

b. An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the host nation, UN, NGOs, and PVOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the humanitarian relief efforts.

11. Military Interface With NGOs and PVOs

a. Commanders must understand that **NGOs and PVOs have valid missions and concerns and that these may complicate the mission of US forces**. Such organizations may be supported where feasible in compliance with military mandates and objectives. The JTF staff should meet with representatives of the humanitarian assistance community to define common objectives and courses of action that are mutually supportive without compromising the roles of any of the participants.

b. **Because of the important role played by NGOs, PVOs, and regional and international organizations, they or their interests should be represented at every level of the chain of command.** NGO and PVO field workers are normally experts in their working environment. These workers are guided by operating principles of their parent organizations, which typically require independence to do the job most effectively.

c. In providing assistance to endangered populations in complex emergencies,[2] **humanitarian relief organizations may view the use of military force to support their efforts or to enforce UN mandates as a means of last resort**. These organizations view freedom of access as the ideal working environment, in consonance with the basic principles of humanitarian assistance. Certain organizations may insist on operating only on this basis and without armed protection. The combatant command's crisis action team, engaged in the preparation of plans for deployment of the JTF into a humanitarian assistance operation, should expect to encounter responses from some humanitarian organizations that are influenced by a profound belief in these principles. Other humanitarian assistance organizations enjoy a good, mutually supportive working relationship with governmental and military organizations.

d. **Commanders should consider the implications of any military-initiated humanitarian assistance projects.** A frequent source of friction between military forces and these organizations is that programs initiated by the military — often of higher caliber than the humanitarian relief agencies provide — are abruptly halted upon change of mission. When this cessation occurs without any transition to the level of assistance provided by the NGOs and PVOs to the local populace, there are problems.

Programs that are started should be sustainable once the JTF redeploys.

e. **Realistic expectations of military support enable agencies to fully capitalize on their interagency experiences.** Within the bounds of security, these organizations must know the following:

- Capabilities and limitations of military forces.
- Services (e.g., shelter, food, transport, communications, security) that the force will or will not provide.
- Varying circumstances that preclude assistance.
- Types and scope of assistance that are appropriate and authorized by US law.
- Lessons learned at the conclusion of interagency operations.

f. As military conditions improve in the area or the duration of the operations lengthens, agendas of engaged organizations may change, and mutual cooperation sometimes becomes more difficult to achieve.

g. Duplication of effort can be avoided and resources can be concentrated where most needed by using the organizational tools described above to coordinate military actions with NGOs, PVOs and other organizations such as the UN.

1 From an interview with Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, 13 September 1994.

2 "Complex emergency" is a term used by the World Conference on Religion and Peace to describe a humanitarian crisis that may involve armed conflict and could be exacerbated by natural disasters. It is a situation in which the prevailing conditions threaten the lives of a portion of the affected population who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to obtain the minimum subsistence requirements and are dependent on external humanitarian assistance for survival.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
C2	command and control
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE USA)
CDRG	Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (FEMA)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USG)
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CONUS	continental United States
CONUSA	Continental United States Army
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/OFDA)
DATT	Defense Attache
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer (DOD)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DFO	Disaster Field Office (FEMA)
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOMS	Director of Military Support
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency (USG)
ERT	Emergency Response Team (FEMA)
ESF	emergency support function (FEMA)
ESG	Executive Steering Group
EST	Emergency Support Team (FEMA)
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer (USG)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FID	foreign internal defense
FPA	foreign policy advisor
FRP	Federal Response Plan (USG)
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center

HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HOC	humanitarian operations center
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IIB	interagency information bureau
IPC	interagency planning cell
IWG	Interagency Working Group (NSC)
J-2	Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff
J-3	Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-4	Logistics Directorate of a joint staff
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of a joint staff
J-6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate of a joint staff
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JFC	joint force commander
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JMFU	joint METOC forecast unit
JOA	joint operations area
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JTF	joint task force
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	Logistics Operations Center
LOGCAP	logistics civil augmentation program
METOC	meteorology and oceanography
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MSCA	military support to civil authorities
MSCLEA	Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIST	national intelligence support team
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA 47	National Security Act of 1947
NSC	National Security Council

NSC/DC	National Security Council/Deputies Committee
NSC/IWG	National Security Council/Interagency Working Group
NSC/PC	National Security Council/Principals Committee
NSCS	National Security Council System
OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OES	office of emergency services
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAO	public affairs officer
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
POLAD	political advisor
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance organization
SCO	State Coordinating Officer
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SYG	Secretary General (UN)
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCACOM	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USCS	United States Customs Service (TREAS)
USDAO	United States Defense Attache Office
USDR	United States Defense Representative
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
WEU	Western European Union

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support. Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed

Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

command, control, communications, and computer systems. Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

common user airlift service. The airlift service provided on a common basis for all Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Continental United States Army. A regionally oriented command with geographic boundaries under the command of United States Army Forces Command. The Continental United States Army is a numbered Army and is the Forces Command agent for mobilization, deployment, and domestic emergency planning and execution. Also called CONUSA. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

developmental assistance. US Agency for International Development function chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Disaster Assistance Response Team. United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A Disaster Assistance Response Team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. See also refugee. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude — both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Federal Coordinating Officer. Appointed by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate federal assistance to a state affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and level of the Federal Coordinating Officer will likely depend on the nature of the federal response. Also called FCO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign assistance. Assistance ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; United States assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or

threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization. (Approved for inclusion of the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and

regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

international organization. Organizations with global influence, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. Joint Staff. The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lead agency. Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

letter of assist. A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military options. A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance

programs may include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other United States Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called NEO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term normally used by non-US organizations. Also called NGO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-

based. "Private voluntary organizations" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations." Also called PVO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

refugee. A civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans, campaign plans, or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 3-08** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: